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ABSTRACT
Guerrilla warfare in Central Luzon from 1942 to 1945 was extremely limited by available
resources and manpower, especially following the mass surrender of U.S. troops in the
Philippines to Imperial Japan during the surrender at Bataan on April 9 th, 1942. By closely
analyzing the primary accounts of Luzon guerrillas Doyle Decker and Robert Mailheau, I seek to
confirm, confront, and consider many established expectations of guerrilla warfare, especially
since much of the established literature espouses a loose set of guidelines for irregular warfare.
In this paper, I analyze the pre-war Philippines in order to establish the decisive disadvantages
that American forces were faced with prior to guerrilla warfare, after which these limitations
were only compounded with the dissolution of U.S. command structure in the Philippines
following the surrender. I then heavily analyze primary interviews and accounts given by Decker
and Mailheau in order to present concrete examples of local cooperation, military limitations,
and environmental hazards that the guerrilla soldiers of the 155 th guerrilla unit faced in Central
Luzon. This study’s purpose is to present a new avenue for analyzing guerrilla tactics through
individual accounts and case studies, so that the human element of decision-making in such
strategy can be taken into account more frequently and incorporated into broader discussions of
guerrilla tactics.
KEYWORDS: guerrilla, survival, Pacific, Philippines, Japan, U.S., Luzon, Bataan, jungle,
interview
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INTRODUCTION

World War II stands as a defining moment in U.S. history for many reasons, particularly
because of the United States’ transition from relative isolation to an overwhelming global and
industrial power in less than a decade. The codified image of the U.S. is that of a grand industrial
power fueled by millions of workers, all unified by a common desire to overcome the shocking
losses incurred during Japan’s raid on Pearl Harbor on December 7 th, 1941. The United States
experienced one of the greatest industrial booms in history on the promise of retaliation against
Japan, and quickly produced one of the most formidable military machines in the world. Japan’s
accompanying invasion of the Philippines on December 8 th, 1941 however, has failed to garner
similar interest, and those who defended Bataan from December 1941 to April 1942 held none of
the advantages that this boom provided. The U.S. defeat was swift and brutal, and those few who
avoided capture after the surrender on April 9th, 1941 resolved to fight in the surrounding terrain
of Luzon, Mindanao, and the Visayan Archipelago. Their struggle contrasts bitterly with the
common image of the U.S. during WWII. U.S. guerrillas in the Philippines were malnourished,
under-equipped, and under-manned throughout the three years preceding the U.S. military’s
return in 1944. The story of the guerrillas of Central Luzon in particular demonstrates that for all
of the U.S.’s industrial progress that was made during the 1940s, it was still a country in
transition, and the guerrillas experienced every disadvantage and trial posed by that transition.

Context of Japanese Occupation
For Japan, the invasion of the Philippines in late 1941 was both heavily dependent on and
coordinated with the strike on Pearl Harbor, and both severed U.S. troops in the Philippines from
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critical reinforcements and supplies. A combination of defensive weaknesses, upcoming
independence, and a dependence on naval reinforcements all contributed to the fall of the
Philippines and the U.S. guerrillas’ ensuing dependence on assistance from civilians. The
Philippines were a remote zone of exile for decades, a place where rival politicians like Paul
McNutt and troublesome military personnel such as Douglas MacArthur were sent in order to
distance them from the mainland United States, either for purposes of political expediency or
career sabotage.1 Equipment and manpower was sparse, due to both the isolationist atmosphere
of peacetime and widespread reservations throughout the U.S. about allocating further funds to
defensive efforts.2 The Philippines were the closest U.S. territory to the Japanese mainland, and
the imperial expansion of the Japanese in the 1930s necessitated an invasion of the Philippines as
a jumping-off point for expansion throughout the Pacific. While the defense of the Philippines
was able to resist the invasion for roughly four months, the Japanese attack pushed into the
Philippines with great efficiency, and surrender on Bataan came on April 9 th, 1942.3
Following the surrender, hundreds of Filipino and U.S. soldiers were soon brought
together in small groups in order to be taken to Japanese POW camps in what has become known
as the Bataan Death March. The Bataan Death March is one of the most emotionally charged
events of the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, and has become a potent symbol of wartime
cruelty among others such as Nanking, the Holocaust, the Rape of Berlin, and the atomic
bombing of Japan. Bob Mailheau was one of the soldiers forced to endure the Death March, and
the brutality that he witnessed stayed with him for decades. 4 The occupation years following the
1

Dean J. Kotlowski, “Breaching the Paper Walls: Paul V. McNutt and Jewish Refugees to the Philippines, 1938–
1939,” Diplomatic History, 33 no. 5 (2009), 878.
2
Kerry Irish, “Dwight Eisenhower and Douglas MacArthur in the Philippines: There Must Be a Day of Reckoning,”
The Journal of Military History, 74 (April 2010), 440.
3
Doyle V. Decker, Why I Joined the Army and How I got to the Philippines (From Postwar Interview with Wayne
Sanford, 1984), 5.
4
Wayne L. Sanford, ed., The War Years (Military History Section, Indiana Historical Society, 1984), 1-5.
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Death March in the Philippines were defined by a chaotic mix of different ethnic populations,
economic turmoil, and national propaganda, but debates still rage concerning the core factors
that informed Japan’s conduct.
Some like historian John Dower cite the idea of the Japanese Yamato race, which
influenced Japanese policy by automatically placing other cultures like those of Korea, Formosa,
and the Philippines on a lower societal and cultural level than the Japanese. 5 While older books
such as “Backgrounds of Conflict” published during the 1940s more directly related Japanese
racial hierarchies to a widespread Japanese belief in the Emperor’s mythical origins, Dower’s
explanation provides a more societally consistent explanation for the lack of compassion
exercised by Japanese soldiers who were expected to view other conquered populations as
inferior.6 One of the most prominent reasons for the Japanese conquest of the Philippines was to
compensate for the lack of a strong agricultural base in Japan which was needed to feed its
soldiers and citizenry, and this led to a common tendency to place the agricultural needs of
Japanese soldiers above that of the local population. 78 This did not endear the new government to
citizens in the Philippines, who had already been promised independence by the U.S.
government.
But what of the soldiers who escaped capture? Options were limited, and many were
trapped on the islands that they had been assigned to either by chance or by choice. The Japanese
occupation persisted for nearly three years, and many soldiers within Luzon and even relatively
well-organized regions like Mindanao struggled to counter the Japanese occupation or maintain

5

John Dower, War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York, 1986), 284.
Kurt London, Backgrounds of Conflict; Ideas and Forms in World Politics (New York, 1945), 191.
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Carel A. Grunder and William E. Livezey, The Philippines and the United States (Westport, Connecticut, 1951),
238.
8
Francis K. Danquah, “Japan's Food Farming Policies in Wartime Southeast Asia: The Philippine Example, 19421944,” Agricultural History, 64 no. 3 (1990), 62.
6

3

cohesion.9 The individual stories of those who persisted and resisted until the time of their
liberation or death warrant further analysis, and these individual accounts highlight the inherent
difficulties of forming guerrilla movements. Organization required stability, and the latter was in
short supply for months following the surrender. Even in previous U.S. conflicts that involved
guerrilla warfare, soldiers were mostly confined to the U.S. mainland, and were able to use
geographical familiarity to their advantage. The Philippines however were not the permanent
homes of most of the U.S. soldiers who were stranded there, and their lack of familiarity with
survival techniques nearly resulted in the death of soldiers like Private Doyle Decker in the
initial weeks of the occupation. Survival and direct resistance in Central Luzon was not always
simultaneously achievable, and the struggle to survive often proved to be more pressing concern
than organization.

Historiography of Guerrilla Warfare in the Philippines
Historiographically speaking, within traditional military accounts of the Pacific War the
Philippines are mostly discussed in terms of their strategic location, and their fall is attributed to
the U.S. Navy’s failure to reinforce and resupply soldiers during the Japanese invasion due to
both the losses sustained at Pearl Harbor and the coordination of the Japanese strike. 10 While
some historians such as Richard Connaughton and Kerry Irish have written works that focus
more on popular figures like Douglas MacArthur (especially Connaughton, who has written
multiple books on the subject), they usually concern the pre-occupation Philippines or focus on
higher-level leaders in guerrilla warfare rather than the everyday soldiers who carried out their
orders. While some works that more specifically focus on irregular warfare by historians like

9

David W. Hogan, U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II (Washington D.C., 1992), 70-73.
Louis Morton, Strategy and Command: the First Two Years (Washington D.C., 1962), 99.
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David Hogan have stated that MacArthur planned on the potential need for guerrilla warfare in
the Philippines (setting up networks with local planters, etc.), Hogan himself admits that his
capacity to do this was limited by the U.S. army’s lack of a dedicated doctrine or preparation
regarding guerrilla warfare.11 U.S. soldiers in the Philippines were prepared to resort to guerrilla
warfare when the time came to surrender or flee, but had no formal preparation to do so, which
cost them in the opening weeks as they struggled to procure food and navigate through jungle
and mountain terrain.
The Bataan Death March and invasion of the Philippines are common historiographical
topics of interest, but the guerrilla warfare that followed is seldom covered outside of scattered
and generalized descriptions of larger-scale movements and supply operations. 12 Efforts are often
made to mention guerrilla warfare in the Philippines within works about World War 2 in the
Pacific and in larger studies of guerrilla warfare, but there are fewer works that exclusively focus
on World War 2 in the Philippines or Central Luzon. I am mostly responding to more
generalized military and social histories, such as the military history work of Louis Morton and
the numerous smaller histories that have been told regarding individual soldiers or families in the
Philippines. Many authors take the social history approach or write historical fiction within the
Philippines, such as “The Crucible: an Autobiography by Colonel Yay” which have told more
individualized stories with a secondary focus on analysis. 13
In many ways, U.S. guerrillas in the Philippines occupy an interesting space within
schemes of irregular warfare. Authors frame irregular warfare in different ways, and while some

11

Hogan, U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II, 65.
Ibid 70, 74.
Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines (Washington D.C., 1953), 503.
13
Panlilio Yay, The Crucible: An Autobiography by Colonel Yay, Filipina American Guerrilla (New Brunswick,
2010).
12
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like Max Boot contend that irregular warfare is personality-based around leaders such as Robert
the Bruce and Mao Zedong, others define irregular warfare by the complete absence of an
official command structure.14 In addition, while writers on the subject such as Colonel Napoleon
Valeriano (writing from a counter-guerrilla Filipino perspective) contend that motivations for
irregular warfare are often rooted in a desire to overthrow an ideologically weak state, soldiers
like Bob Mailheau and Doyle Decker fought initially to avoid surrender rather than overthrow
the occupation.15 Based on Mailheau and Decker’s accounts, they were focused more on survival
than creating a widespread rebellion focused on wresting control of the islands from the Japanese
(often because the latter goal was much more unrealistic), and while their resistance meets much
of the criteria prescribed by historians like Russell Crandall (such as a lack of a clear hierarchy,
diplomatic engagement, or not acting as representatives of their state), their descriptions also
deviate in significant ways.16 Instead of serving as the initial plan of the United States, guerrilla
warfare was a strategy that individual soldiers employed after defeat in order to survive and
subsist until the U.S. returned. 17

Approach and Sources:
My approach will primarily concern Mailheau and Decker’s experiences, and what they
reveal about guerrilla warfare in Central Luzon after the fall of the Philippines. Avoidance,
concealment, and relationships with civilians are the primary strategies described in said
accounts, and violence was often only employed by necessity. While the aforementioned

14

Max Boot, Invisible Armies: an Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present (New York,
2013), xxi.
15
Napoleon Valeriano, Counter-Guerrilla Operations: The Philippine Experience (New York, 1962), 9.
16
Russell Crandall, America’s Dirty Wars: Irregular Warfare from 1776 to the War on Terror (New York, 2014), 7.
17
Ibid, 7.
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qualifications for irregular warfare that have been provided in works like Crandall’s book
“America’s Dirty Wars” are useful for the purposes of definition, analyzing the reasons that
irregular warfare was employed in the Philippines help distinguish the U.S. guerrillas from
common patterns of irregular warfare. While in normal military circumstances irregular warfare
is often a carefully considered option, in the Philippines it was a necessity for the displaced
remnants of a defeated army. For example, while Crandall’s qualification that irregular warfare
involves the lack of an official command structure is useful, Decker’s account specifically
illustrates that the former chain of command mattered much less than individual merit after the
surrender, which specifically addresses Crandall’s theory. While in many respects the guerrillas
of Central Luzon meet the accepted qualifications of irregular warfare, the reasons that they met
those criteria provide a more personal point of analysis through which to view the often undermanned guerrilla movements of the Philippines.
The purpose of my first section is to provide context for the dire circumstances
experienced by guerrilla fighters in the Philippines from 1941-45, and to then present the
experiences of soldiers Bob Mailheau and Doyle Decker in Central Luzon in my second and
third sections. My primary body of sources consists of several interviews with Mailheau and
Decker conducted by historian Wayne Sanford in the 1980s, in which they offer their
experiences and perspective on the war and their time in the Philippines. For example, Decker
stated that he joined the army primarily so that he could have a job and support his family, and
was assigned to the Philippines rather than being able to choose his posting. 18 These details
partially explain Decker’s initial shock at Japan’s invasion, as well as his constant focus on
survival. Bob Mailheau conversely stated that he joined the army out of fears of military

18

Malcolm D. Decker, Essential Commentary Made by Doyle Decker (From “Transcription of Tape,” April 4,
1984), 1.

7

expansion in Germany, voluntarily choosing the Philippines as a posting far from potential
German-American conflict.19 While Mailheau’s reasoning was more motivated by worldwide
factors, he still viewed the Philippines as remote and averse to conflict, which further emphasizes
the Philippines’ status as a remote territory in U.S. jurisdiction. While both Decker and Mailheau
eventually joined together in the 155th guerrilla unit, both were forced to resist as a matter of
survival in an unfamiliar region long before any talk of organization could be made a reality.
Their accounts are specific to Luzon, so they can only speak to the levels of communication and
supplies present where they were, and the specificity of my primary sources means that I will be
discussing guerrilla warfare in Luzon rather than warfare in other regions like Mindanao.
One of the more significant sources that I will use is a series of transcribed journal entries
written by Decker throughout his time in the Philippines. These entries are primarily useful for
their accounts of aid from civilian sources and Decker’s commentary concerning his efforts to
survive. In addition, Decker’s focus on food supplies is constant (much more than concerns of
ammunition or other weaponry), and this again indicates that survival was a more pertinent
factor to him than continued military sabotage and resistance. He distinguishes several sources of
aid throughout his account, among them aid from the Fassoth family in the form of a stable camp
for U.S. guerrillas to stay at and various Filipino and Negrito sources that vary from one-time
transactions of money in exchange for “cigarettes, sugar and rice” to being contacted by a
guerrilla leader in Manila.20 His accounts describe a life constantly on the move prior to finding
Mailheau, and the first two years of his foray into Luzon were fraught with confusion, caution,
and a constantly shifting roster of fellow guerrillas.

19

Wayne L. Sanford, ed., Resistance on Luzon: Narratives by: Robert T. Mailheau (Military History Section,
Indiana Historical Society, 1984), 2.
20
Doyle V. Decker, Doyle Decker’s Journal Entries in the Philippines (From Transcription conducted by Malcolm
Decker), 13, 36.
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I am mostly interpreting my sources for the purposes of understanding the soldiers’
survival techniques as well as the numerous difficulties they encountered attempting to form
larger groups. Survival was their top priority in many cases, and their accounts indicate that the
guerrillas constantly roamed from place to place, with only brief pauses at locations like
Fassoth’s Camp.21 In addition, the interviews taken after the fact are useful for understanding the
war’s longer-term impact on Decker and Mailheau, as well as their perspectives in retrospect. I
can compare larger-scale claims from secondary works on guerrilla warfare to the perspectives
of the guerrillas themselves, and analyze discrepancies or consistent aspects. For example, while
books like “The Philippines and the United States” detail the struggles of the U.S. and Japanese
governments to secure the aid of local populations through promises of independence, the shelter
and navigational aid provided by Fassoth’s camp and local tribesmen that is described in
Decker’s account indicates that U.S. guerrillas were helped by multiple class groups in the
Philippines (specifically Luzon) throughout their survival in the jungle. 22 Specific examples like
these help to more concretely demonstrate the relationships that the guerrillas had with different
groups around them, and the situations in which these relationships were formed.

Conclusion
Decker and Mailheau’s experiences demonstrate that guerrilla warfare can be just as
unfamiliar and daunting to the guerrillas themselves as it is for the enemy tasked with countering
it. While their knowledge of local terrain grew over time, both soldiers were caught off guard by
the sudden victory of the Japanese, as well as the failure of the U.S. government to provide
support until late 1944. Japan’s foothold in the Southwest Pacific was solidified by victories in

21
22

Ibid, 24.
Grunder and Livezey, The Philippines and the United States, 247.
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the Philippines, Borneo, and China, and had the resources necessary to maintain a grip on their
new territories (see Figure 1, the “Map of the Southwest Pacific” on page 11 for geographical
reference to these four locations). Decker and Mailheau were forced to improvise constantly in
Central Luzon (shown within the Philippine islands in Figure 2, “Map of the Philippines, 1944”)
, and while there were glimmers of ingenuity, many of their earlier efforts resulted in painful
lessons that nearly killed them, and were only salvaged by the generosity and skills of the
disparate groups who supported them. Without the contributions that Filipino and Negrito
populations made, neither Decker or Mailheau would have survived the war or formed the 155 th
guerrilla unit, and their examples demonstrate the necessity of support more clearly than other,
larger-scale analyses can. My sources will primarily consist of Decker and Mailheau’s account
(many thanks go to my grandfather, without whom I would not have access to transcriptions of
these accounts), and while this will not be a comprehensive account of guerrilla warfare in the
Philippines, it will hopefully provide some insight into the numerous daily challenges involved
with waging it.

10

23

Figure 1. Map of the Southwest Pacific, 1942, including the Philippines, China, Australia, and
the Southern tip of Japan

23

Charles R. Anderson, “Map of Southwest Pacific Area, 1942,” Archives.gov, accessed December 21st, 2019,
https://www.archives.gov/research/military/ww2/philippine/maps.html.
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Figure 2. Map of the Philippines, 1944, including Luzon, Bataan, and Corregidor.

24

Leyte Center for Military History Brochure, “Map of the Philippines, 1944,” Archives.gov, accessed December
21st, 2019, https://www.archives.gov/research/military/ww2/philippine/maps.html.
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GUERRILLA WARFARE IN THE PHILIPPINES: BROKEN DEFENSES AND THE
WAR FOR SUPPORT

The harsh conditions that soldiers Doyle Decker and Robert “Bob” Mailheau faced from
1941 to 1945 in the Philippines were the result of decades of uncertain rule by the U.S. and
burgeoning Japanese military expansion. When Japan invaded the Philippines on December 8 th,
1941, the island chain’s defenders were woefully underprepared, and lacked the necessary
equipment, support, and manpower that they needed. By April 1942, Japan secured military
victory in the Philippines, and the few remaining U.S. soldiers who refused to surrender were
forced to retreat into the surrounding mountainsides and jungles in order to conduct guerrilla
warfare. Guerrilla warfare had not been officially prepared as part of the U.S.-Pacific strategy,
but was instead used by soldiers as a means of survival. The complete absence of official
military support throughout the Japanese occupation of the Philippines was a direct result of both
inadequate defensive planning and the Philippines’ political placement within the United States,
both of which made the Philippines an easy military target for Japan. Japan achieved victory
through both its own military efficiency and the weakness of the United States’ hold over the
Philippines, and the guerrilla warfare employed by U.S. soldiers was a matter of necessity
created by disastrous defeat.

Guerrilla Warfare: Tenets and Reasoning
First, it is important to clarify what the term guerrilla warfare implies as it is used here,
since it has become a broad label with several interpretations. While there are several terms for it
including guerrilla warfare, irregular warfare, and insurgent warfare, the most consistent

13

characteristic of the term is the use of non-traditional tactics in order to compensate for military
disadvantages.25 The term “non-traditional” is highly subjective, but it is mostly used in
reference to standards of official warfare given by the Geneva Convention, such as clear military
hierarchies, openly carried weapons, and adherence to international rules of war. 26 Groups have
embraced guerrilla warfare for a wide variety of reasons, but it is almost always utilized as an
alternative to traditional warfare when facing a militarily superior opponent that would be
difficult to defeat conventionally. 27 The measures employed by guerrillas defy both strict
military hierarchies and the Geneva Convention’s given characteristics (including the
abandonment of open military dress, openly carried firearms, and other markers of official
military status), and these measures are utilized to overcome disparities in military power, either
through forcing a political stalemate or whittling down opposing forces throughout a prolonged
period of time.28
The character or ethical nature of guerrilla warfare has also been a matter of debate, and
the ideological nature of many guerrilla movements such as the Viet Cong, Mujahedeen, and Al
Qaeda have tied guerrilla warfare to strong ideologies by association. 29 However, while this
ideological association and extremism are consistent components of guerrilla warfare, it is not
required for guerrilla warfare to be employed. Survival is as strong as a motivation as any
political inspiration to instill reform or instill a new government, and survival was a constant
challenge during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. Some modern interpretations also
associate guerrilla with a kind of “romantic” thrill that attracts younger recruits, who are worn

25

Crandall, America’s Dirty Wars, 7.
Ibid, 7.
27
Anthony James Joes, Modern Guerrilla Insurgency (Westport, Connecticut), 6.
28
Jeffrey Record, Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win (Washington D.C., 2009), ix.
29
Valeriano, Counter-Guerrilla Operations, 5.
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down over time by the hardships of survival. 30 This kind of initially romantic view, however, is
not readily apparent in primary accounts that describe guerrilla warfare on Luzon, and the
struggle to merely survive repeatedly plagued U.S. soldiers even prior to the occupation. Food
ran low constantly, disease ran rampant, and tensions ran high, and many of these problems were
apparent early on as soldiers scrambled to retreat into the mountains and jungles of the
Philippines.31 Securing sufficient food and ammunition had been a constant issue even during the
defense of Bataan weeks before the surrender, and this lack of basic necessities did not
encourage a romantic view of the situation. The Luzon Guerrillas’ situation following the U.S.’
surrender was dire, and rather than instilling a new government, their initial goals were to
survive and establish a somewhat stable environment to operate from.
Guerrilla warfare in the Philippines was not initially planned, but instead arose from the
chaos following Japan’s invasion. For many U.S. soldiers stranded on Luzon after the army’s
surrender, guerrilla warfare was one of the only options for survival, and chose to employ it out
of pragmatism rather than extremism. Many recent writers on guerrilla warfare associate 21 st
century guerrilla warfare primarily with either underdeveloped societies or insurgencies, but
guerrillas in the Philippines were the remnants of the defeated army of a major world power. 32
The defense of the Philippines in December 1941 began with a meager amount of military
resources and ended with the complete dismantling of the U.S. chain of command, leaving
soldiers to fend for themselves in order to survive. Guerrilla warfare as a means of survival or as
an alternative to surrender is tricky to define, since the difference between group-scale survival
and dedicated resistance is subjective at best. While writers on guerrilla warfare often

30

Joes, Modern Guerrilla Insurgency, 7.
Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, 257.
32
Crandall, America’s Dirty Wars, 8.

31

15

acknowledge the importance of individuals maintaining a steady food supply and base of
operation, they often do so in passing rather than analyzing the true importance of a stable
environment in creating guerrilla cells.33 Luzon guerrillas were not strongly motivated by strong
ideological concerns such as forming a new government independent from the U.S. or Japan, but
were instead focused on establishing moderately stable conditions in order to more effectively
survive and coordinate stranded soldiers.

Struggle for Control: The U.S. in the Philippines
One of the essential reasons that the United States’ defeat in the Philippines was so swift
was that the islands were on the verge of independence in 1941, and had already been considered
remote in terms of both geography and administration. By the time of the invasion on December
8th, 1941, the United States possessed the Philippine Islands as a colonial territory since 1898,
when it acquired them from the Spanish following U.S. victory in the Spanish-American War.
The Treaty of Paris, ratified by the Spanish in 1898, ceded the Philippines, Guam, Puerto Rico,
and a number of other assorted Spanish colonial possessions to the U.S., which dramatically
increased the country’s role in global affairs and trade despite its isolationist identity. 34 However,
while the U.S. was granted legal control of the Philippines, a number of problems arose when
U.S. rule was resisted throughout 1898 and the early 1900s. The forces of Filipino resistance
leader Emilio Aguinaldo had already employed guerrilla warfare for years to resist Spanish rule
before the U.S. was granted legal control, and had already declared an independent Philippine
Republic by 1898.35 The U.S. now had to conquer sovereign territory in order to maintain its

33

Joes, Modern Guerrilla Insurgency, 6; Valeriano, Counter-Guerrilla Operations, 10-11.
Julian Go, Patterns of Empire: The British and American Empires, 1688 to the Present (Cambridge, 2011), 55.
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claim to the Philippines, and the same guerrilla tactics that had been used by Aguinaldo’s forces
to defeat the Spanish were now employed against the newly arriving U.S. army, which ironically
employed similar tactics against the Japanese nearly five decades later.
The guerrilla tactics used against the U.S. during the Philippine-American War were
nearly textbook examples, and were much more organized than the initial resistance of U.S.
guerrillas towards the Japanese in mid-1941. Resistance forces under General Aguinaldo often
avoided open confrontation, and preferred consistent military harassment over large-scale
conflicts with the U.S. army. Choosing the time, place, and pace of combat is one of the core
tenets of guerrilla warfare, and Aguinaldo’s forces were already familiar with resisting larger
military powers.36 The U.S. army’s answer to this tactic was a “seek-and-destroy” mentality,
which ultimately resulted in additional civilian casualties and failed to contribute to a longerterm military strategy.37 While the U.S. sought a decisive battle, Philippine resistance forces
were unwilling to fight conventional battles, increasing the frustration of U.S. army forces in the
Philippines. The U.S. army presented an enormous threat in open combat, so resorting to every
available advantage was the only option for the revolutionaries. While this worked in the short
term, it also meant that the U.S. army was now aware of the Philippine forces’ unwillingness to
fight openly, and the army employed extreme methods to counter it.
While the U.S. was able to knock out several military targets throughout the initial
fighting in 1899 with relative ease, little effort was made to form or enact any long-term
strategy.38 Victory was defined by the defeat of the enemy instead of fulfilling tactical objectives,
which was an unwise doctrine to employ against a guerrilla force determined to prosecute a
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prolonged conflict of attrition.39 In addition, the U.S. did not have the necessary interpreters or
experience to adequately communicate with the civilian population in the Philippines, severely
limiting its ability to establish working relationships or compromise instead of applying further
military force.40 Even if U.S. intentions had been inherently peaceful, the restlessness of soldiers
combined with the experiences of many commanders in the Indian Wars and the inherent
frustration caused by guerrilla warfare resulted in an extremely brutal conflict marked by mass
killings and bloody displays of military force.41 By 1902, the U.S. had quashed Aguinaldo’s
resistance and secured the majority of the Philippines despite making several key mistakes, but
its rule throughout the following decades was distant and reluctant. Despite the force employed
to conquer the Philippines, the new territorial government struggled to reconcile its colonial rule
with traditional U.S. ideals of sovereignty for nearly forty years.
While the U.S. and Japanese invasions both involved extreme amounts of violence, the
critical difference was that the U.S. had the time to capitalize on its conquest. Through the
successful implementation of the Monroe doctrine, the U.S. was able to stave off foreign
interference while strategically projecting its interests at home and overseas, which was one of
the many reasons that it was able to maintain control over its territories. While the U.S. used the
Philippines for cash crops and built its own systems of education and trade in the region, it had
nearly five decades to form institutions in order to reinforce its rule without direct competition
from other empires. Japan lacked this period of uninterrupted development after it conquered the
Philippines in 1941, and ultimately had less than four years to accomplish what the U.S. had in
over forty. The U.S. occupation of the Philippines was not benevolent, but was definitively
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fading by 1934 with a direct legal promise of independence, a promise not granted to other U.S.
colonies such as Guam and Puerto Rico.
Once it had mostly eliminated resistance in the Philippines, the U.S. government formed
a territorial government rather than admitting the Philippines to the Union as an incorporated
state, which is one reason why the Philippines were never widely viewed as a true part of the
U.S. by many in the continental U.S..42 While statehood for continental territories was similarly
convoluted (especially throughout the Southwestern United States), the Philippines’ geographic
remoteness contributed to its perception as an irrelevant and distant possession, and
congressional debates regarding “the Philippine Problem” of the territory’s right to sovereignty
continued throughout the early 1900s. 43 Prior to the passing of the Tydings-McDuffie act in
1934, stateside debates over the granting of Philippine independence consisted of political
posturing with little effect. While congressional Democrats generally advocated for the
independence of the Philippines from 1898 to 1911, it was little more than a symbolic gesture
without a majority in either the House of Representatives or the Senate. 44 Even when proindependence Democrats secured a house majority and presidential victory through the election
of Woodrow Wilson in 1913, the U.S. government still could not reach an agreement regarding
independence by the end of Wilson’s term. Advances were made in smaller concessions such as
trade agreements and export taxes through legislative policies like the Jones act in 1916, but the
core problem of colonial rule by the U.S. went unresolved until the passage of the TydingsMcDuffie Act in 1934.45
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By 1934, the U.S. government finally expressed a concrete desire to grant the Philippines
independence, and began to reduce its defensive military presence in the process, which in turn
was one of the key reasons that Japan was able to defeat the U.S. defenses so swiftly. The
passage of the Tydings-McDuffie Act was a critical moment for the U.S. administration, since it
expressly promised independence to the Philippines by 1946. 46 During the U.S. invasion of the
Philippines in 1898, Philippine hopes of independence were facilitated by General Aguinaldo’s
resistance after negotiations between Spain and the Philippines worsened in 1897. 47 By 1941, the
U.S. issued a legal promise of independence, and while there was arguably no guarantee that the
U.S. would honor its agreement, the Tydings-McDuffie act was the most direct contract that the
U.S. could legally make. While the U.S. tenure in the Philippines from 1898 to 1946 was
relatively short, it still took nearly forty years to shift from U.S. colonial rule to Philippine
independence, and this meant that the Japanese invasion of 1941 struck at a vulnerable point
during the transition to independence. This interruption was one of the key reasons that defenses
in the Philippines were weakened when Japan invaded in December 1941, but was also one of
the reasons that Japanese rule encountered numerous difficulties from April 1942 to 1945.

The Defensive Situation in 1941: Military Capabilities
Just prior to the Japanese invasion at the end of 1941, the defensive capabilities of the
U.S. army in the Philippines were very limited in terms of both available manpower and
modernized equipment. Throughout the early 20 th century the defense of the Philippines was
hampered by available defensive budgets and the overall Pacific strategy of the U.S., and U.S.
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Pacific planners quickly believed that a total defense of the Philippines was untenable. 48 Plans
were made to establish a more significant air presence in order to compensate for the
Philippines’ dependence on naval support, but the invasion struck before any meaningful number
of planes could be transferred. As early as 1926, the Joint Board of the army and Navy
(established in 1903) had begun to advocate for a strategy based more on strategic bombing and
naval capability than the use of the Philippines as a hub within the Pacific, and adopted a
defensive posture that shaped the Philippines into a military choke point. 49 Regardless of the
inherent difficulties of securing funds during peacetime, the Philippines were placed in a
precarious position within the U.S. Pacific strategy, and were left vulnerable.
The budget for the defense of the Philippines was very limited compared to the strategic
aims of Philippine officials such as Major Dwight Eisenhower and General Douglas MacArthur,
who was appointed as Military Advisor to the Philippines in fall 1935. 50 Despite attempts to
secure an effective defense budget from the National Assembly of the Philippines, financial
limitations continued to hound the defensive development of U.S. army forces in the islands, and
throughout his tenure as Military Adviser, MacArthur was unable to meaningfully improve
defenses in the Philippines prior to the invasion in 1941. 51 Even a proposition by General
MacArthur to train 20,000 Filipino volunteer soldiers at the beginning of 1937 was deemed
impractical by Eisenhower, who realized that the 1936 defense budget for the Philippines had
left no room for training, paying, or arming such a force. 52 To put this in perspective, the U.S.
army estimated that Japan could “transport to the Philippines a force of 300,000 men in 30
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days… (while) the Americans would then have to meet this attack with… 11,000 troops of which
7,000 were Filipinos…”53 Simply put, the gap in numbers alone left defensive forces in the
islands very vulnerable without sufficient naval support and reinforcements, and attempts to
lessen the gap as well as develop the Philippines’ base of manpower rather than committing U.S.
troops were unsuccessful or unsupported.
Reasons for the aforementioned reductions in budgets vary, but arguments for increased
funds proved difficult to make throughout the inter-war years. Undoubtedly, however, the
relative lack of funding was a result of both the Philippines’ upcoming independence and the
peacetime priorities of the U.S. government. The Philippines were set for independence in 1946
via the Tydings-McDuffie act, meaning that direct U.S. investment in establishing longer-term
defenses was inherently limited, and investment in future defenses did not directly benefit the
U.S.. Any military assets such as defensive fortifications would be lost in a decade aside from a
few scattered “naval reservations and refueling stations”, limiting the United States’ long-term
military investment in the region. 54 This also hindered efforts to divert more U.S. troops to the
Philippines than was strictly necessary, which was one of the many reasons that MacArthur
attempted to expand the role of local volunteers with mixed success. Without any long-term
incentive to develop the Philippines defensively, the U.S. adapted its overall Pacific strategy,
which left the islands vulnerable to attack from superior air and naval power. The Japanese had
both, and existing U.S. defenses were inadequate without support from allied ships.
Air power in the Philippines was also in a transitional stage during late 1941, and could
not adequately match Japan’s world class air force on its own. While the existing transfers of
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planes conducted by the U.S. army could have potentially given the Philippines impressive
offensive capability in a matter of years, the process was far from complete and defensive
airpower was completely outclassed. 55 Even relatively modern planes such as P-35 fighters and
B-17 Flying Fortress bombers were only available in very limited numbers, and less than half of
the over 300 aircraft stationed in the Philippines were even “suitable for combat.” 56 Clark airfield
(which was north of Manila) was the only airfield capable of housing and utilizing available
heavy bombers like the B-17, of which there were only 35. 57 By the Army Air Force’s given
estimates, there were 35 heavy bombers, 90 operational “pursuit planes” (which would later be
re-dubbed fighter planes), 12 older and outdated fighter planes, and 21 other miscellaneous
aircraft.58 By 1941, the Zero fighter utilized by Japan had already proven itself to be extremely
competent and capable of destroying larger forces of lesser quality in a matter of weeks. Against
China’s limited air force in 1937, “approximately thirty Zeros accounted for 266 confirmed
kills,” one of several proving grounds in which the Japanese army achieved a great deal of
success.59 Thus, the Philippines were left vulnerable, as even the air power that was expected to
compensate for reduced naval assets was extremely limited and failed to significantly aid the
defense of the Philippines in 1941.
These numerous problems related to budgeting, supplies, and the approaching
independence of the region also affected attempts to rebuild local forces. While General
MacArthur made attempts to substantially develop the Philippine army through conscription, his
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plans were hampered by all of the aforementioned problems. 60 The reluctance of the Philippine
or U.S. governments to provide more substantial resources meant that even establishing training
facilities was difficult, which crippled basic efforts to create a sustainable defense force. 61
Additionally, standard equipment was also poor among U.S. soldiers (including many WWI-era
rifles such as the Enfield and M1906 Springfield Rifles), and the Philippine army did not receive
much better.62 Japan’s military (the army specifically) had already proven that it could defeat
foes with similar equipment when it battled Nationalist Chinese forces, who had also used a
loose collection of outdated equipment.
Opinions regarding the possibility of a Japanese invasion of the Philippines were also
mixed at best. While news of the Japanese invasions of China and Manchuria had reached some
Chinese-Filipino populations in the area who later resisted Japanese rule, it took time for
American soldiers like Bob Mailheau to realize that the Philippines were a viable military target
for Japan.63 Prior to the outbreak of war in the Philippines, the Chinese community resisted
Japan’s invasion by donating to the “salvation movement,” a financial cause formed by overseas
Chinese populations in order to aid anti-Japanese defensive efforts following the invasion of
China in 1937.64 Anti-Japanese sentiment rose alongside further Japanese invasions like
Manchuria and especially China among the Filipino-Chinese community, and this sentiment
could even be measured economically (by some estimates over $2,000,000 worth of funds had
been donated to defensive efforts against the Japanese in Manchuria by the Philippine Chinese
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alone).65 Despite this, only specific groups like the Chinese-Filipino population directly
considered a Japanese invasion of the Philippines, and even in light of Japan’s military buildup
and the U.S. government’s responses like the oil embargo, many were unprepared for a direct
attack.
Simply put, all of these factors meant that the U.S. was unable to adequately prepare the
Philippines (specifically Luzon and Bataan) for the Japanese invasion in December 1941. The
Japanese army had proven its offensive capabilities in Manchuria and China, and considering the
Philippine defense’s resources, had a clear military advantage. The approaching independence of
the Philippines lessened potential investment in its defense, and the United States’ overall Pacific
strategy was devised to work around the Philippines’ air complement and reinforcements from
the U.S. Navy, which was destroyed at Pearl Harbor on December 7 th, 1941, one day before the
invasion of the Philippines. While defeat was not certain, the coordination and rapidity of the
Japanese assault on both the Philippines and Pearl Harbor meant that both American and
Philippine forces on the island faced a very steep challenge, and had to face a highly competent
and well-equipped Japanese invasion force with outdated equipment, limited aerial support, and
(most crucially) an inability to receive the supplies than most of their defense strategy was built
around. Circumstances were not in the U.S. army’s favor, and too many elements of the
Philippines’ defense were compromised in one or more critical ways.

Japanese Motivations and Reputation Prior to the Invasion
Despite the numerous defensive weaknesses of the Philippines, a Japanese invasion was
not a foregone conclusion in 1941, even in light of its earlier military expansion throughout East
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Asia during the 1930s. However, Japan’s growing economic dependence on foreign materials
and proximity to the Philippines contributed significantly to the selection of the Philippines as a
military target. Additionally, the Philippines were a prime target for its geographical position, its
economic resources, and its numerous defensive weaknesses. Japan’s invasions of Manchuria
and China in 1931 and 1937 respectively had already demonstrated its willingness to dismiss
global opinion, and an oil embargo by the U.S. only compounded the strategic importance of
Japanese expansion. In addition, while defensive buildup in the Philippines was limited, the U.S.
was beginning to assemble a bomber complement in the Philippines that would be dangerous to
Japanese naval forces if allowed to continue unabated.66 Following a U.S. oil embargo in the
summer of 1940, Japan had more than adequate motivation to commence with a military strike,
and the failure of U.S. planners to recognize these motivations only accelerated the Japanese
conquest of the islands.67
While Japanese expansion became directly relevant to the U.S. following the attacks on
Pearl Harbor and the Philippines in December 1941, it had already been prevalent in Asia
throughout the 1930s.68 Japanese expansion began at least as early as the invasion of Manchuria
in 1931 and arguably extended back to the annexation of Korea in 1910. While Japan both
invaded and secured territory at an alarming pace throughout the 1930s, it was severely limited
by its dependence on foreign oil, a critical strategic weakness that became much more
pronounced after the U.S. oil embargo in 1940. 69 While Japan proved that it could easily act in
spite of international opinion (particularly the ineffectual League of Nations) during the invasion

66

Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 69.
Ibid, 64.
68
Bob T. Wakabayashi, “Emperor Hirohito on Localized Aggression in China,” Sino-Japanese Studies, 4, no. 1
(October 1991), 4.
69
Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 64.
67

26

of Manchuria, it was still dependent enough on foreign resources that it could not engage in
rampant militarism without consequence. Japan’s goal was to become militarily and
economically self-sufficient, and in order to do so it could not stop at Manchuria and China.
Conquering the Philippines fulfilled several of Japan’s military and diplomatic objectives,
including securing a point of invasion for other surrounding islands like Borneo, conquering an
isolated target free of initial influence from U.S. naval forces, and expanding Japan’s evolving
economic sphere.70
Japan’s primary motivation for its expansion into Asia during WWII has been debated
endlessly, but the desire to oust Western influence from the region and assert the Japanese
empire as the savior of Asia was one of the most prominent. One of Japan’s goals was to create
buffer zones against Western empires, and the Pan-Asian state that Japan was attempting to form
was part of their greater effort to oust these empires that were viewed as invasive interlopers. 71
By establishing a network of allied powers across Europe and expanding its own influence
throughout Asia, Japan would create a shield against foreign intervention and enable itself to
promote its interests unhindered by western interventionism. The largest of these “buffers”
would have consisted of Japan, Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union. While this may seem a
contradictory combination given Germany’s later incursion into the Soviet Union and the longstanding rivalry between Japan and Russia, at the time this choice of allies had a fair degree of
merit. The Soviets had signed non-aggression pacts with the others, and the geographical
locations of Japan’s various allies would place a zone of protection around the entirety of
Japan.72
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For these reasons as well as many others, Japan decided to invade the Philippines, thus
provoking the entry of the U.S. into WWII. One of the primary reasons for invading the
Philippines was to procure a more stable food supply and to incorporate the Philippines into a
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.73 Following the invasion of French Indo-China in
September 1940, Japan was economically crippled by the ensuing U.S. oil embargo, meaning
that Japan was now on a strict time limit if it could not become self-sufficient. 74 These issues of
supply and consumption meant that Japanese strategy (particularly by the army) now had to rely
much more on the conservation of military resources and constantly conquering resource-rich
areas in order to sustain Japan’s military machine. The Japanese army and navy disagreed on
how to address these shortages. The Navy advocated for more cautious plans while the army
tended to argue for speed and decisive strikes. 75 The overriding consensus between the two
branches, however, was that a protracted conflict with the U.S. would be impractical, and that
that to prevail the Japanese military would have to secure victory quickly and decisively. Japan’s
strategy in the southeast Pacific revolved around establishing control over the Philippines and
using it as a base to advance “step-by-step” through nearby regions, including Borneo, Java,
Sumatra, and Malaya, whose natural resources (especially petroleum) were essential for
sustaining Japan’s military machine.76
The Philippines were included as a target in most of Japan’s military plans, and the
combination of its geographical location with the relative weakness of its defenses meant that the
Philippines were a prime target for invasion. While the Navy advocated for a step-by-step plan,
the more rapid strategies forwarded by the army called for immediate strikes on multiple regions
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including Guam, Malaya, and the Philippines. 77 Even the Navy’s more cautious plans called for
simultaneous strikes, and this was ultimately how the attack was carried out in December 1941.
The Philippines were geographically isolated, and simultaneous strikes were excellent for
severing U.S. supply chains and taking advantage of the limited defenses available on the
islands. One of the only critical factors that remained was an opportune moment to attack, and
the lackluster Philippine defenses meant that the U.S. Navy was the primary concern. The Navy
was the primary avenue for reinforcements and support available to the Philippines, and needed
to be taken out to limit the U.S.’ defensive efforts as much as possible.

The Invasion and Fall of the Philippines
Despite the numerous defensive and political shortcomings of the Philippines in 1941, the
efficiency with which Japan was able to seize the islands and decisively cut off any hope of
reinforcement was beyond the United States’ worst fears. Japan’s well-equipped amphibious
infantry and air assets quickly annihilated the meager air force afforded to the Philippines in
mere days and coordinated perfectly with the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor in 1941. The
invasion of the Philippines was nearly a worst-case scenario, and every tactical flaw inherent in
the use of Bataan as a defensive point for reinforcement was exploited and maximized by a series
of highly coordinated strikes. While there had been some debate surrounding Japanese strategy
and the scope of their targets, the sheer number of targets attacked “almost simultaneously” by
Japanese forces extended far beyond Pearl Harbor, surpassing the expectations of many U.S.
planners who did not believe that the Japanese could strike multiple substantial targets at once. 78
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These simultaneous attacks accomplished the dual goals of taking U.S. forces by surprise and
completely seizing the initiative in the Pacific, and the larger scope meant that the conquest of
the Philippines would be unhindered by additional reinforcements or supplies.
Japan eliminated most of the U.S. army’s air power within a matter of hours by
conducting low-flying strafing runs, and the most critical airfields on Luzon such as Clark Field
were crippled in less than 24 hours.79 In addition to the inability of naval forces to respond after
the strike on Pearl Harbor, forces in the Philippines now lacked air support, and Japan’s worldclass planes were able to attack without fear of interception. However, this did not mean that
they had free reign, and by Doyle Decker’s account (who was in the 200th coastal artillery, antiaircraft section at the time) anti-air batteries enjoyed more success than the available air corps.
He recalled, “I was in the anti-aircraft section. We were having pretty good luck knocking the
Jap planes down and we were several miles behind the lines… but when they began to cut
rations we began to feel we were not going to get any help soon. Then when the army ordered
MacArthur out, I think we all realized it was hopeless.” 80
The destruction of much of the U.S. naval forces at Pearl Harbor was one of the most
decisive components of the Japanese victory, and it completely crippled existing strategies. The
pre-war defensive strategy in the Philippines was designed to allow U.S. soldiers and the
Philippine army to fall back to Bataan on the island of Luzon and entrench themselves in order to
allow time for reinforcements to arrive. While supplies could be rationed and temporary defenses
could be created, the primary means of reinforcement and resupply was eliminated when Japan
destroyed a critical number of U.S. ships at Pearl Harbor. This inability to receive support was
nearly incomprehensible to soldiers like Mailheau, who stated that “when the Japs first attacked
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that first day over there, my god, we knew we were vulnerable as hell… But that was the
damnest [sic] thing. We never once figured that the Americans would not be able to make their
way over for support… we even felt that way on Bataan, right up to, practically, the day of the
surrender.”81 The U.S. and Filipino soldiers were cut off, and the Japanese were now able to
conduct naval landings with limited reprisal.
The Japanese conducted several landings (six in total, of which all but two were centered
on the island of Luzon), and did so on December 8 th, only one day after initial contact with U.S.
forces at Pearl Harbor.82 None of the landings experienced substantial enough resistance to
prevent the Japanese Navy from fulfilling its objectives, and the Japanese had established a solid
hold on Luzon by the 17th, taking only 10 days to accomplish all of its preparations (cutting off
reinforcements, supply lines, and taking territory critical to U.S. defensive efforts). 83 While
Japan had expected an even more rapid victory, their ability to cut off aid from the Philippines
still proved critical in their military success, and was one of the key reasons that they were able
to conquer most of the Philippines by May 1942. 84 Official strategy still dictated that U.S.
soldiers were to move back to Bataan, and preparations for a fall back to Bataan began as early
as December 23rd.85 By March 12th, the situation had worsened enough to prompt General
MacArthur’s withdrawal, which dealt a significant blow to morale. 86 Resistance continued for
several months, but as the siege of Bataan progressed Japan’s severance of critical U.S. supply
lines caused resources to run low, and food soon became a primary concern among the defenders
of Bataan.
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By early April, all hope of holding out had run out, and negotiations for an official
surrender began. The reinforcements and supplies that had been cut off continued to critically
hamper any attempts to mount substantial counter-attacks, and even defense was now unfeasible
due to the food shortages that now plagued the defense of Bataan. 87 Military pressure from
Japanese forces was constant, and the continued attack wore down the various battalions left for
the defense of the city, and, -contrary to the orders that General King had been given, he chose
surrender rather than to fight to the last man, the latter of which both MacArthur and Roosevelt
had ordered.88 Once the surrender order was issued to U.S. soldiers, many instead chose to
retreat into the jungle in order to avoid capture. 89 Decker wrote, “At this time several of us began
plans to escape to the mountains. When the surrender came, we all realized it would only be a
matter of time before the Japs were on us.” 90 The combination of inadequate defenses, Japanese
expansion, economic maneuvering by the U.S., and the complete severance of critical support
structures hastened Japan’s conquest of the Philippines, which was complete in less than four
months. The U.S. and Philippine army were both soundly defeated in short order, and those who
had withdrawn to Bataan were now either captured or wandering in the surrounding jungles and
mountainsides. Japan had invaded and conquered with a degree of military efficiency that
impressed even optimistic officers at the time, and the flaws in existing U.S.-Pacific strategy
proved to be the downfall of the United States’ entire defensive effort throughout not only the
Philippines, but the entire Pacific theater. 91
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However, not all soldiers either American or Filipino had fallen back to Bataan, and
while the islands had been largely conquered, remnants of the American army survived. While
many had chosen to stand and fight on Luzon, local Philippine volunteers had the opportunity
during the opening stages of the invasion to reintegrate into their former communities instead of
surrendering alongside the Americans, which significantly complicated the distinction between
soldier and civilian later on.92 Soldiers outside of the city like Doyle Decker made plans to
escape into either the jungle or mountains (the mountains were more specific to Luzon), and
throughout the next three years, the Philippines housed several independent pockets of resistance
until official U.S. forces returned in 1944. 93 Luzon was the dedicated location for the U.S.
forces’ last stand, and it was now a survival zone for hundreds of displaced soldiers who were
faced with occupation by a foreign power and limited supplies that could not be replenished. The
time for direct conflict between the U.S. and Japan in the Philippines ended in April 1942, and
did not resume until MacArthur’s return in 1944. Instead, the pace of conflict was dictated by
irregular warfare for nearly three years, and the survivors of the invasion were forced to
improvise.

Japan’s Government: Rhetoric and Reality
The Japanese occupation of the Philippines was a tenuous balance of cooperation and
retaliation, and while there were numerous shortcomings with Japan’s approach to governing the
Philippines, they were presented with a politically delicate and tense situation. While they had
conquered the Philippines with startling speed, Japan now had to balance the extraction of
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resources and the elimination of guerrillas with fostering a cooperative territorial government,
and it proved impossible to achieve both. The U.S.’s invasion of the Philippines in 1898 was a
similarly bloody affair to the Japanese invasion, but the U.S. government had the advantage of
time with which to promote its interests and culture in the region. Japan was placed on a much
more limited and intense time-table due to its limited resources, which placed it in an even more
uncomfortable position than the U.S. of 1898. While Japan’s occupation government attempted
to create positive relationships with the Filipinos, it ultimately settled on a harsh strategy of
retaliation against the guerrillas by punishing any individuals who aided or housed guerrillas
throughout the islands, primarily in the forms of burning property, maintaining regular patrols,
and killing suspected U.S. collaborators. 94 Collaboration with the new government was heavily
encouraged, and Japanese forces took available opportunities to infiltrate and subvert guerrilla
movements from within by working with informants in order to disrupt or eliminate guerrilla
cells.95 While this strategy was at times effective in turning public opinion against guerrillas, it
also undermined valuable Japanese pretenses to peace and cooperation. It promoted more
decisive commitments to either side, and the U.S. promise of independence complicated Japan’s
pledges of freedom from Western empires, considering that the Philippines had already been
legally promised such autonomy.
Initial impressions of the new Japanese occupation were unfavorable and marked by
atrocity. Japan’s wartime reputation for brutality was first brought to the forefront in the
Philippines during the forced march of U.S. and Filipino prisoners to Japanese internment camps
in April 1942, which became infamously known as the Bataan Death March. During the march,

94

Air University (U.S.). Aerospace Studies Institute, Concepts Division, The Role of Airpower in Guerrilla Warfare
(World War II), (Alabama, 1962), 101; Decker, Why I Joined the Army, 69.
95
Air University, The Role of Airpower in Guerrilla Warfare, 101.

34

both U.S. and Filipino soldiers were treated with a degree of cruelty that is still discussed as one
of the foremost examples of Japanese wartime atrocities alongside the massacre at Nanking,
China in 1937. While disease was a common cause of death during the march, starvation and
random killings by Japanese soldiers were also leading causes of the nearly 600-750 American
and 5,000-10,000 Filipino deaths, and the seeming randomness of these murders was viewed
with suspicion and bewilderment by both soldiers at the time and modern historical writers. 96
The brutality shown during the Death March compounded outrage at the U.S.’ surrender in April
1942, since the surrender at Bataan had now additionally resulted in the suffering and deaths of
thousands of Filipino soldiers in addition to U.S. forces. Approximately 65,000 of the 75,000
prisoners were Philippine army instead of U.S. servicemen, inciting additional anger among
Filipinos at both the U.S. for abandoning the islands and towards the Japanese for their blatant
cruelty.97 While in reality surrender had been enacted in response to dwindling supplies and an
inability to even feed the defenders of Bataan, the brutality that ensued meant that initially, the
surrender was considered tantamount to abandonment by the U.S. government.
Nevertheless, the new territorial government knew that it had to act quickly in order to
establish its legitimacy, and it soon declared the creation of an independent Philippine
government in 1943. In theory, this was a beneficial political move that both undermined earlier
U.S. promises and encouraged a better working relationship between Japan and the Philippines,
maintaining the appearance of independence while in reality relegating the Philippines to a
puppet government of the Japanese Empire. The many problems with this were in its execution,
which mainly served to alienate potential collaborators and undermine the advantageous pretense
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of independence. While the U.S. promise of independence had gone through a number of
alterations and delays, MacArthur had nevertheless cultivated an impressive image for himself in
the Philippines alongside President Quezon throughout his tenure, and time had rendered the
U.S. administration both tired and the distribution of military forces sparse. Conversely, Japan
was faced with a limited timeframe of both resources and available manpower, and while its
initial strike had been devastating, fully seizing control of each island and eliminating all U.S.
soldiers who had not surrendered were very difficult tasks.
The continued presence of remnants of the U.S. army, however, damaged Japan’s local
relationships over time. While searching for U.S. soldiers, Japanese occupation forces burned
camps and various villages, and smaller-scale atrocities increased in frequency as they attempted
to flush out U.S. guerrillas.98 The Philippines had faced colonial occupations at least twice before
the Japanese under the Spanish and Americans, and the continued presence of Japanese soldiers
undercut the notion that the Philippines were finally freed from colonial influence. While the
Tydings-McDuffie act would not completely free the Philippines from U.S. influence (especially
American business interests), it was still the most direct promise of a legal escape from colonial
rule that had been proposed since Spain claimed the islands in the sixteenth century. The
Japanese implementation of colonially administered independence was severely flawed, but there
were very few alternatives in retrospect. Had the Japanese government stated its intentions
honestly, the offer would have seemed doubly unattractive. The granting of independence in
name only eroded the messaging of the new government as the occupation progressed, and the
presence of U.S. guerrillas meant that Japanese forces needed to balance their efforts at flushing
out guerrillas with local cooperation.
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Though the adopted methods of retaliation and strict punishment came with significant
disadvantages, the Japanese measures were effective in securing limited acceptance. Despite the
inherent contradiction of an independent government within the economic sphere and oversight
of a larger empire, the Japanese decision to grant independence found strong support among
some pro-independence groups in the Philippines including the Patriotic League of Filipinos (or
Makapili), most of whom rallied behind the Japanese promise of independence even near the
war’s end in 1945 as American forces were retaking the Philippines. 99 This loyalty even resulted
in an open declaration of war by the Makapili against U.S. forces as they re-took the islands as
late as 1945.100 Despite Japan’s difficult goal of establishing the second major reorganization of
Philippine government in less than fifty years, they managed to secure support from certain
elements that had been waiting for a chance to retaliate against the U.S., and worked with them
in order to defend Japan’s new territory.
Despite the intensity of this support from groups like the Makapili, it was not enough to
compensate for the damaging diplomatic effects of Japanese conduct throughout the majority of
the occupation. An intensely loyal minority is not enough to secure victory in a protracted
guerrilla conflict, which requires healthy relationships with the wider public in order to limit
strategic opportunities for resistance forces. Specifically, the Makapili are only estimated to have
numbered around 5,000 members, a tiny number in a region with a population of 16,000,303. 101
In addition, a significant amount of the zeal shown towards the Japanese promise of
independence had existed long before the war, and Japan took advantage of pre-existing
revolutionary ideals rather than instilling widespread Japanese nationalism, one of the necessary
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components of establishing a greater Asian Co-Prosperity sphere. 102 Even the legitimate
developmental strides and working relationships that Japan made with local groups could not
help them achieve widespread acceptance in the Philippines, and the Japanese administration’s
inability to make good on their rhetoric and promises of true independence and Pan-Asian
cooperation contributed to “rampant Anti-Japanese sentiments” in the Philippines by the end of
the occupation.103
Despite these tactical and diplomatic shortcomings, however, the anti-guerrilla tactics
adopted by the Japanese were at times effective in their intended functions, which were to punish
guerrilla sympathizers and eliminate pockets of resistance. On Luzon, for example, the Japanese
succeeded in hiring “civilian collaborators” in order to infiltrate guerrilla cells, providing
information and intelligence that was crucial in countering guerrilla movements. 104 In addition,
the reprisal against civilians who aided Americans was not a strategy devoid of merit, since in
some communities the harsh punishments created resentment towards guerrillas by association
rather than the Japanese, which was what the tactic was designed to accomplish. 105 By making
resistance undesirable and cooperation beneficial, the occupation sought to balance its reputation
with ample amounts of fear and admiration, and it was effective, albeit mostly in the short term.
Ultimately, severe time constraints and a core inability to keep rhetoric and policy
consistent damaged Japan’s effectiveness as the colonial administrator of the Philippines. While
Japan’s counter-guerilla strategy adapted and made strides in cooperation with local populations,
the decentralized nature of the guerrilla movements and collaboration between civilians and
remnants of the U.S. military meant that the complete elimination of resistance by 1945 was
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nearly impossible. With more time and ability to commit resources, the new administration may
have been able to make good on its promises of cooperation and economic partnership, but the
constant issues of dwindling military resources and an imperative to defeat the guerrillas led to
drastic measures that undercut said pledges. The U.S. returned in late 1944, and in the end, three
years proved to be far too short a timeframe for success. The wounds of invasion were still fresh,
atrocities undermined attempts to create provisional relationships, and economic conditions
proved too extreme to develop the cooperation necessary to create a new Philippine-Japanese
union. While punishment served its intended function, it also came with costs, and guerrilla cells
were ultimately able to capitalize on them by forming local relationships that the new occupation
simply could not.

Conclusion
The defense of the Philippines crumbled in less than five months, and the complete defeat
of the U.S. army caused a scattering of U.S. soldiers who were not captured during the surrender
of Bataan. These were the conditions in which Decker and Mailheau became guerrilla fighters.
Mailheau had served in the defense of Bataan, and like many soldiers on Luzon, suffered greatly
during the Bataan Death March. He was one of the few (estimated to be less than 400) to escape
it, joining with other soldiers after coming extremely close to starvation and death. 106 Decker had
the benefit of fleeing into the surrounding jungle, but faced extraordinarily harsh survival
conditions that nearly killed him during the critical initial weeks of the occupation. While largescale political and historical conflict between the U.S. and Japan had resulted in the U.S. army’s
defeat in the Philippines, it was now individual soldiers like Decker and Mailheau who now had
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to live with the consequences and salvage what they could from complete disaster. For nearly
three years from 1942 to 1945, they survived in the jungle and resisted Japanese rule however
they could. Without the help that they received from fellow soldiers, local tribesmen, and
citizens throughout the occupation they would almost certainly have perished in the opening
weeks.
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BOB MAILHEAU: PERSEVERENCE AND COOPERATION IN RESISTANCE

Robert “Bob” Mailheau took a very active approach to guerrilla warfare, despite being
prevented from doing so on multiple occasions by the Japanese occupation and Central Luzon’s
environment. By March 1945, he had survived the Bataan Death March, a severe tonsil infection
that left him nearly unable to function, and multiple skirmishes with Japanese soldiers. He could
not have done so without the assistance of several civilians, former Philippine army soldiers, and
Negrito tribesmen, but his survival was also due to his persistence and his willingness to take an
active role in forming a larger resistance movement. Mailheau was instrumental in forming the
155th guerrilla unit, and was able to create a lasting rallying point in Central Luzon alongside
soldiers Clay Conner and Frank Gyovai. While other groups in the region fractured internally
and constantly struggled over leadership, the tactics of the 155 th that Mailheau helped create
molded the group into a cooperative entity with the surrounding villages, and formed a mutual
relationship with the civilians that had already saved his life multiple times by 1943. Mailheau
joined the army out of the fear of involvement in a European conflict, but quickly adapted in
order to resist the Japanese occupation by establishing relationships with both U.S. soldiers and
local forces, which undoubtedly contributed to the 155 th’s success and ensured Mailheau’s
survival.

Life Prior to the War and the Surrender on Bataan
Importantly, Bob Mailheau served in the Philippines as a matter of choice rather than
circumstance. When he joined the U.S. army on August 10 th, 1940, he was given the option to
choose his posting, and selected the Philippines under the assumption that they would be far
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from any potential military conflict in Europe.107 While he was somewhat aware of Japan’s
reputation as a world power, most of his attention prior to 1941 was focused on Germany’s
military buildup during the 1930s. Throughout his school life in Southern California, most
discussions regarding another potential world war were the subject of humorous jabs between
students. In one of Mailheau’s post-war accounts compiled by historian Dwayne Sanford during
the 1980s, he stated that while some comments were made towards Japanese students regarding
“which side” Japan would be on in a hypothetical future war, he dismissed it as schoolyard talk
at the time rather than any attempts at insightful political commentary. 108
Throughout these 1980s interviews, Mailheau was adamant that the turning point for him
and many of his friends was the arrival of several Jewish families who had immigrated to their
neighborhood in California in 1940. 109 After discussing the political and military situation in
Germany with the families in his neighborhood, Mailheau was convinced that a GermanAmerican conflict was disturbingly possible. Mailheau volunteered alongside two of his high
school friends for the army Air Corps in August 1940 and chose to go to the Philippines, citing
that its remoteness and distance from Europe were the key reasons for his choice. 110 Mailheau
also viewed the Philippines as an opportunity for something of a vacation, directly summarizing
his rationale as “What the heck, let’s do some travelling.” 111 For Mailheau, talk of German
expansion motivated him to seek a posting as far from his fears of conflict as possible, which
meant that he chose the remote Philippines. While he succeeded in this regard, it also placed him
much closer to Japan’s military sphere.
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Prior to the outbreak of the U.S.-Pacific War in December 1941, Mailheau’s rationale
held true, and his experiences mostly consisted of guard duty with scattered rumors of activity
among small radical political groups in the Philippines. There were minimal concerns regarding
Japan, and Mailheau stated that “the atmosphere at that time was le se faire [sic]. There was
nothing to be concerned about.”112 While there were worries about scattered resistance from
domestic organizations like the Communist Hukbalahap group (referred to as “Huks” by
Mailheau), most of it amounted to concentrated areas in the Philippines like the city of Angeles,
where Mailheau was frequently called in for guard duty. 113 Suspicions were mostly directed
primarily towards civilians asking about sensitive military information, including the numbers of
aircraft at varying airfields in passing conversation.114 While Mailheau spoke of multiple brawls
between American soldiers and Filipino civilians in certain communities like Angeles, most of it
resulted from conflicts between individuals or small groups in town rather than any orders to
investigate radical or Communist political activity. Some political groups such as the Ganap (a
group comprised of pro-Japanese Filipinos) made attempts to provoke action from the
Hukbalahap group, but it did not prompt any serious discussion regarding Japan. At the time,
Mailheau and the soldiers around him were aware that they needed to exercise caution when
speaking in towns on guard duty as a general rule, but speculation of direct invasion was rare. 115
The previously relaxed atmosphere in the Philippines shifted to renewed concern for
Mailheau when news of the Axis pact between Italy, Germany, and Japan in September 1940
came, citing that initial worries of U.S. involvement in war began to spread around October
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1941.116 Specifically, he later stated that as of October 1941, “It looked more and more like we
were going to be involved in Europe. The Axis forces had announced their allegiance, so it kind
of just added up—one plus one equals two.” 117 The Axis Pact initiated Mailheau’s fears of war
with Japan, who in the event of war with the U.S. would be brought into the conflict by proxy.
By Mailheau’s accounts, the possibility of a conflict directly initiated by Japan had not crossed
his mind. He even went so far as to state that “up to a couple of months before Pearl Harbor, we
(he and his fellow soldiers) never gave the Jap threat a second thought.” 118 While in hindsight
this attitude seems strange, Japan had been an Allied country throughout World War I, and its
reputation had not soured substantially enough to warrant concern from Mailheau or the soldiers
around him. While Mailheau began to consider the likelihood of a Japanese military invasion
over time, another conflict with Germany was still the most pressing issue in his mind, and
despite Japan’s numerous invasions throughout the 1930s and the United States’ economic
responses (such as the oil embargo), he and his fellow soldiers only seriously considered war
with Japan as a primary enemy mere months before the invasion.
Despite the extremely limited defenses in the pre-war Philippines described earlier,
soldiers felt that they had little cause for widespread concern prior to the crippling of the U.S.
Navy in December 1941. Despite the budgetary shortcomings faced by the U.S. defense in the
Philippines, Mailheau was still somewhat confident in the army’s defensive capabilities prior to
the invasion, with the notable exception of the outdated air complement. While the soldiers’
equipment was somewhat outdated, Mailheau and his fellow soldiers each had a respectable
array of items, including “rifles… side arms, helmets, gas masks… a knapsack with a blanket,
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and a few food items,” as well as water canteens. 119 According to Mailheau, he did not appraise
the situation as either overly hopeless or fortunate, but knew that their air force was a weak link
in available defenses. Specifically, he stated that prior to the invasion “we didn’t feel that
confident, but we didn’t feel that vulnerable either. But we knew our Air Force was a big
joke.”120 Mailheau was particularly aware of the outdated aerial equipment due to his posting in
the Tow Target Squadron at Clark Field, which towed aerial targets to various locations around
the base for later use as training targets for anti-aircraft and planes. 121 As mentioned previously,
Mailheau was also under the impression that the U.S. Navy would be able to reinforce the
Philippines, and the possibility that the United States’ naval capability could be wiped out was
not widely considered.122 This confidence, however, was founded with very limited knowledge
of Japan’s military efficiency, as well as its plans to cripple the Philippines’ means of
reinforcement and supply.
Mailheau saw the devastating effects of the invasion as early as the first day December
8th, 1941, and his stationing at Clark Field (a major U.S. airstrip) meant that he witnessed Japan’s
air assault firsthand.123 Mailheau recalled that, “When the war started, the Japs pretty well wiped
us out at Clark Field. What few planes that were flyable… flew down to the southern islands,
and we didn’t have many fighters to speak of. None of the squadron survived.” 124 With the
destruction of the planes at Clark Field, many of the personnel dedicated to flight training such
as Mailheau were moved west in order to secure underbrush cover from enemy planes until they
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could be moved to Bataan. Soldiers were soon ordered to carry weapons at all times and to
prepare to fall back to Bataan in the case of retreat, which had already been discussed as basic
protocol in the event of invasion.125 Fortunately, Mailheau was able to more easily transition into
an infantry role due to universal infantry training at the time of his enlistment, and he was soon
incorporated into the 24th pursuit group, where his role was primarily to engage in anti-sniper
patrols.126 Throughout the following months, Mailheau was involved in defensive efforts to drive
back Japanese landings around Bataan and fend off attacks from Bataan’s rear, but he ultimately
received the surrender order in April 1942.
When Mailheau was given the surrender order, he and a number of fellow soldiers
immediately decided against it.127 Mailheau’s decision was not based on pre-existing information
about Japan’s wartime treatment of prisoners, but rather on considering the surrender foolish. 128
Mailheau’s initial plan was to rendezvous with like-minded soldiers on the slopes of Mount
Bataan, and he stashed weapons and ammunition in order to prepare. 129 However, his attempts
were rendered completely unsuccessful when he was intercepted by a large group of Japanese
soldiers on his journey to the rendezvous point. 130 While he considered either fighting or
escaping, in the moment he decided to surrender in order to survive, and threw up his hands.
Though he had been openly dismissive of any form of organized surrender, he chose it when
confronted with the immediate threat of violence. While Mailheau recalled that the Japanese
soldiers “bullied him a little bit,” they otherwise captured him without incident, and moved him
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to a nearby base camp where he was kept for four days before being placed in the infamous
Bataan Death March.131

Death March and Escape
Mailheau’s worst fears of capture were exceeded by the hostility that he faced
throughout the following weeks, and while accounts of the Bataan Death March’s brutality are
widely available, Mailheau’s descriptions are nevertheless unnervingly specific. The primary
trait of the march that Mailheau emphasized in later interviews was the needlessness and
frequency of the brutality demonstrated towards American soldiers, recalling that, “…slaughter
and brutality was a continuous thing, believe me. It didn’t happen once every three days… It
happened in my case damned near every fifteen, or twenty minutes.” 132 The brutality that
Mailheau witnessed was frequent, and Mailheau expressed difficulty in adequately conveying the
daily experience of the march. When describing it, Mailheau stated that “What I say here, you
might have heard several times. I know, most of you have seen captured war films of the Bataan
Death March. And all of those programs that they show you on television are limited to half-anhour, or an hour, and they jump from here to there, to somewhere else. And you don’t really get
to see the full impact of what went on.” 133 While his early impressions during the Death March
convinced Mailheau that the experience was going to be unpleasant, its constant tortures
motivated Mailheau’s escape attempt on the tenth day of the March by wearing down his
willingness to cooperate over time. It convinced him of the importance of both resisting the
occupation and working with civilians in order to do so, and inspired many of his later strategies.
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The Bataan Death March is already one of the more extensively analyzed atrocities of the
U.S. Pacific War, but its importance in shaping perceptions of Japan’s wartime character cannot
be understated. Shortly summarized, it was the forced march of Filipino and American POWs to
internment camps by Japanese forces in the aftermath of the surrender at Bataan on April 9 th. The
Bataan Death March (referred to simply as the “Death March” by Mailheau) has become
infamous for the several hundreds of Filipino and U.S. casualties inflicted by Japanese soldiers
along the march’s path, and has become emblematic of Japan’s capacity for wartime brutality
during WWII.134 The Death March only lasted approximately 5 days, but resulted in the loss of
hundreds of U.S. soldiers and thousands of Filipino soldiers. 135 While the 1930s and 40s
witnessed similar massacres and displays of random violence carried out by many militaries, the
Death March stands as one of the most brutal atrocities inflicted on U.S. throughout WWII, and
is one of the most direct examples of Japan inflicting the same colonial violence upon its
conquered populations as the empires it was attempting to supplant. 136 In addition, Filipino
casualties were much greater than American losses, which did not help to support Japan’s claims
of liberation.137 Japan attempted to paint itself as a savior of Asia through its anti-Western
rhetoric and retaliation against Western colonial power, but repeated several mistakes perpetrated
by the empires that it was attempting to replace.
While determining the causes of such frequent atrocity is complicated given the
individual and state-level factors of Imperial Japan, Mailheau surmised that many of the displays
of cruelty that he witnessed were perpetrated in order to dissuade the public from aiding the
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surrendered U.S. and Filipino soldiers.138 While Japan’s adherence global conventions of warfare
throughout WWII was complicated by anti-Western sentiments and conflicts between individual
Japanese officers and the government, this made little difference to Mailheau at the time, who
was instead concerned by the numerous shows of violence that he witnessed and experienced
along the Death March’s path.139 On one occasion, Mailheau recalled Japanese military trucks
deliberately attempting to knock marching U.S. soldiers off of the side of the road, as well as
other executions of POWs.140 In another case, he described Japanese soldiers slicing U.S.
soldiers with a bayonet on the side of the road as both a method of direct punishment for
disobedience and as a public deterrent to empathetic civilians. 141 While Filipino civilians
continued to provide food to the soldiers in spite of this, these showings still shocked Mailheau
and other marching U.S. soldiers, who were unprepared for the extent of violence that they
witnessed and suffered. While secondary works have chronicled the brutality of WWII-era Japan
for decades since, at the time Mailheau and the soldiers around him had only previously regarded
Japan with mild apathy, which meant that their reactions to these atrocities were particularly
intense.
Mailheau and his fellow soldiers also had to contend with limited resources, especially as
it soon became clear that their captors would provide little. Food and water were both
particularly scarce during the Death March, and Mailheau had to rely on his pre-existing stores
of food and canteen water for fourteen days. Judging by Mailheau’s remarks, he and several
other soldiers were initially uncertain about whether or not they would be provided with food,
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but were soon aware that this would not generally be the case. 142 Fortunately for Mailheau, he
had been able to prepare food and fill his canteen with enough water for at least a few days, and
was able to ration its contents effectively enough to use it for around four days. Aside from these
small stocks, they were dependent on their guards and friendly civilians for any resupply, and the
resources that they were able to procure from Japanese soldiers was inconsistent at best. 143
Once again, support from civilians was shown very early on following the surrender, and
the contributions that they made saved the lives of Mailheau and other prisoners. Food was
tossed to soldiers by onlookers whenever possible, and these provisions were some of the only
food that Mailheau and his fellow soldiers received throughout the march. 144 Mailheau stated that
even while Japanese soldiers continued to execute U.S. POWs as a deterrent, “the Filipinos
continued to line up on the sides of the road and toss whatever they could give.” 145 While aid
from Japanese cooks or even occasionally soldiers did occur, it was also much more inconsistent
than help from civilians during the march, and considering the lack of any food or water given to
Mailheau during the fourteen days of capture and ten days of physical marching (outside of
canteen refills occasionally allowed by Japanese guards), it could well have been the difference
between life and death for soldiers forced to participate in the march. 146 Mailheau directly
attested to this, and stated decades later in an interview that “I tell you… if it wasn’t for the
Filipinos… If it hadn’t been for them, myself (and many others) would (not) be around today.
And we’re so greatful [sic]. And you know, they didn’t have to do that. If humanity could take a
lesson from the Filipinos… I’m sure the world would benefit.” 147 The nearly thankless aid that
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civilians provided left such an impression on Mailheau that he continued to praise their efforts
throughout his interviews in 1984, and his gratitude could not have been more direct. It was not
the last time that Mailheau depended on support from Filipino civilians to survive, but their
willingness to aid U.S. soldiers despite direct deterrents and personal risk left a lasting
impression on Mailheau, and his gratitude was repeated throughout his later recollections.
To his surprise, Mailheau managed to procure food from individual Japanese cooks and
soldiers during the Death March, and mentioned that his guards were more likely to share rice
following large meals with excess amounts of food.148 In one case, a Japanese cook not only
provided Mailheau with food, but also multiple U.S. soldiers after Mailheau indicated that they
were also in need.149 Despite the tremendous cruelty that characterized most of his experience in
the Death March, Mailheau still received support from Japanese personnel, albeit in limited
amounts. Considering that punishment would have been swift for these Japanese soldiers for
providing any aid, it is surprising that they were willing to do so at all with the possibility of
execution by their commanders, and while the Death March has justifiably earned a negative
reputation, there was a natural variance in the soldiers’ capacity for cruelty. 150 Brutality was not
universal among the Japanese soldiers, and Mailheau’s accounts of their genuine contributions at
significant personal risk dispel many of the narratives of inherent Japanese cruelty despite the
otherwise horrid conditions of the Bataan Death March. Whether or not it compensates for the
widespread killing of POWs is up for debate, but considering Mailheau’s understandable
vehemence towards the Death March, it is surprising that he made note of the help he received
from Japanese soldiers decades later in 1984. However, it was not enough to convince Mailheau
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that he could survive the Death March, and by the tenth day, Mailheau had resolved to either
escape or perish.
When he finally got his chance, Mailheau successfully escaped from the Bataan Death
March, which was rare but not unprecedented. Reliable estimates for the number of successful
escapees are difficult to come by, but the combined number of American soldiers to escape or
avoid the Death March was no greater than 400, a paltry number compared to the more than
10,000 U.S. soldiers who were placed on the march (especially since the figure of 400 includes
those who avoided the Death March entirely).151 While Mailheau described his guards as
constantly observant, he also noticed a potential opportunity for escape between various points
on the road, especially after patrols began to loosen. His guess for the cause of the lessened
security was that “By then [ten days into the journey] we had lost so many of the fellows that I
guess the Japs figured that none of us had the energy to make an escape.” 152 Noticing this lull in
concentration, Mailheau determined that he would be able to successfully escape by slithering
off through the various brush areas and thickets along the way, and move into the rice paddies. 153
Fortunately, he was also somewhat familiar with the surrounding geography due to his stationing
at Clark Field prior to the invasion.
He encouraged others to take advantage of similar opportunities along the march’s path,
but to do so one at a time so as to not draw attention or reveal that escapes were being
planned.154 Mailheau recalled that the other soldiers who he discussed his plans with told him not
to attempt escape, still believing that the Geneva Convention would be honored. What they
witnessed in comparison to Mailheau is unknown, but these statements still stand out as fairly
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odd considering the notorious conditions of the Death March, as well as the nearly universally
negative reputation that it has garnered. Nevertheless, Mailheau’s escape plans were not leaked
to the Japanese guards, and Mailheau soon made good on his promise to attempt escape. He
managed to “crawl from the side of the road, at one of the infrequent rest stops to the rice
paddies...”155 and successfully escaped, marching for an undetermined distance before collapsing
from exhaustion and being discovered by a group of Filipinos. Help could not have come at a
more opportune time, and throughout the following weeks, Mailheau was again saved by
Filipino civilians. He was in desperately poor physical condition when he was found, and by his
own recollection, he weighed “a hefty 72 pounds” compared to his usual 190 following his
escape from the Death March.156 After two weeks of infrequent food and water, Mailheau was
overjoyed to discover that the Filipinos who took him in were willing to share food with him,
and even when it soon became clear that Mailheau’s physical condition was not meaningfully
improving, they also sent him to a Catholic convent in order to recover. He recalled,

They had food with them. They had a watermelon—a basketball watermelon. God, that
tasted good!.. Then they took me several hundred yards beyond that, into a little grass
shack… It was a good place for me to hide for about ten days, or so. I really wasn’t
getting any better physically, and there wasn’t a heck of a lot they could do for me, so
they arranged for me to go to the Catholic convent in Santa Rita. And the nuns literally
nursed me back to a start to being healthy again.157
Had Mailheau been treated with any less care or encountered an enemy patrol, he would
have certainly died in the rice paddy where he was found. He was severely weakened both
physically and psychologically (even admitting that when he was found, he no longer cared
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whether they were friendly or hostile out of sheer exhaustion), and the lengths that his caretakers
went to in order to facilitate his recovery were extraordinary. 158 He was able to stay in the
convent from May until September, and throughout his stay “met many people, learned their
feelings, strengths, weaknesses, economics & [sic] politics.”159 He also became convinced that
the continued presence of U.S. guerrillas was having a tangible effect on local morale, and
believed that the relationship between civilians and U.S. guerrillas was crucial for each group’s
long-term survival. He stated that

We [U.S. guerrillas] had to be on our toes. Actually our lives were in the hands of all the
natives we came in contact with. The one thing that made us comfortable with the
populace was the fact that we [Americans in general] were very well like(d) [sic] before
the war and ugly incidences [sic] involving the GI were at a minimum. Another was the
fact that the Japs invaded, killed, raped, stole and ravaged at every turn. He treated the
Filipino as a conquered animal and never made an attempt to show friendship or
concern.160
Despite Japan’s political attempts to incorporate the Philippines, Mailheau personally
observed cruelty severe enough to convince him that Filipino and Negrito support was a direct
response to it. Many of the instances described by Mailheau and Doyle Decker show that support
from Filipino populations came too early to be solely motivated by Japanese wartime cruelty,
and said support persisted beyond the opening weeks of the occupation. The presence of the
American guerrillas provided native populations with a new option through which they could
directly disrupt Japanese rule, as well as provide information in a manner that would not leave
them as vulnerable to direct reprisal as open conflict. However, Mailheau could not operate on
his own for long, and needed to find other guerrillas as soon as possible.
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Guerrilla Warfare after Escape: Resistance in Transition
While he had escaped the Bataan Death March, Mailheau was now concerned with
finding other guerrillas to cooperate with, and while he managed to do so fairly quickly, he was
nearly killed by a U.S. soldier in the process. After drifting between various barrios (small
villages in the Philippines that surrounded major cities such as Angeles), he was able to meet
with fellow guerrilla and friend Joe Donahey, who was staying nearby. 161 They managed to
secure shelter in a shack in a nearby village, but Mailheau was nearly killed one night during an
unexpected meeting with soldiers Clay Conner and Edwin Ramsey. While Mailheau and
Donahey had been expecting company that night, they had not planned on meeting Conner or
Ramsey at the time, who unexpectedly arrived the same night. While Mailheau was not hostile
towards them (only stepping out to check if they were the company that he and Donahey were
expecting), Ramsey surprised Mailheau by directly aiming a .45 caliber Colt pistol at him and
demanding to know who he was.162 While Mailheau managed to convince him that he was not an
enemy spy, he was certain that Ramsey fully intended to kill him if he could not be persuaded,
and this incident was the most direct threat that Mailheau encountered from another soldier.
Tensions were extremely high regarding guerrilla information, and fears of betrayal or
infiltration by Japanese collaborators nearly resulted in Mailheau’s death.
Thankfully, Mailheau did not encounter any soldiers as directly hostile as Ramsey
throughout the rest of his experience in the Philippines, and only knew Ramsey for a few days
before joining with Conner and Donahey prior to the formation of the 155 th guerrilla unit.
Shortly after meeting Ramsey, his group numbered four (Donahey, Mailheau, Ramsey and
Conner), and all but Donahey sought to create a larger guerrilla unit. Donahey’s reticence was
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not without merit, considering that even groups of four Americans could easily attract unwanted
attention or be described to Japanese anti-guerrilla forces. Over the next few weeks, their small
group traveled throughout nearby foothills and made plans to head north and link up with Russell
Volckmann’s guerrilla unit in Northern Luzon, which had made significant strides in organizing
guerrilla resistance throughout the region.163 However, Donahey preferred to remain hidden in
the jungles of Banaba, and debates over joining with larger guerrilla units delayed their ability to
link with Volckmann, and ultimately rendered their efforts unsuccessful. 164 Mailheau recalled
was that they “had heard information—not a lot of information--- of Volckmann’s and
Blackburn’s activities, and it just seemed like that was the logical place for soldiers to get to, and
try to survive.”165 Ramsey, by contrast, had given Mailheau the impression that he wanted to be a
part of a larger official military organization again, and that guerrilla warfare did not appeal to
him. Whether this was what caused Ramsey to split from the unit is unknown, but even in a
group only comprised of four members, it was difficult to decide on a course of action, let alone
agree on the reasons for doing so.
Unfortunately, despite only receiving limited information regarding Blackburn and
Volckmann’s guerrilla activities, Japanese forces cut off central Luzon from the north, and
succeeded in preventing any of the group from rendezvousing with northern guerrillas. 166
Throughout the following months, Mailheau and Conner drifted between multiple groups and
took multiple precautions in order to guard against discovery by Japanese patrols, especially as
rumors of any groups of American soldiers tended to spread quickly. In Donahey’s absence,
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Mailheau and Conner met up with a soldier named Frank Gyovai, who also later joined the 155 th.
However, despite their best attempts to split their ranks, Japanese soldiers still followed up on
rumors of five American soldiers in their area (since they had joined up with two other soldiers
in the meantime), and Mailheau’s group was forced to escape and backtrack into familiar
territory.167 Any attempts to form or maintain a larger group were constantly hindered, and the
heavy Japanese activity both to the North and South prevented Mailheau’s differing guerrilla
groups from making much progress. Japanese anti-guerrilla efforts were much more prevalent in
Central Luzon than the North, and were able to prevent the various regional guerrilla units from
combining or organizing effectively. 168 Until the formation of the 155th (which still employed
smaller subgroups in order to prevent discovery), Mailheau was unable to find or remain with a
stable guerrilla unit, and Japanese efforts to contain guerrilla movement, seek out organized
activity, and punish supporters all effectively prevented him from joining a larger unit for
months.

Creation and Operation of the 155th Guerrilla Unit
By April 1943, Mailheau and Conner joined with guerrilla Frank Gyovai around the
Banaba area of Central Luzon, which was roughly nine miles southwest of Clark Field. 169
Around this time, they began to make plans to form a guerrilla unit themselves rather than
joining a pre-existing force, likely due to their unsuccessful efforts to travel north of Central
Luzon. Mailheau, Conner, and Gyovai decided to create the 155 th guerrilla unit, which they
named after the 155 mm. “Long Tom” artillery pieces used by the U.S. army. 170 Soon after their
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decision to form the 155th, they came into contact with Bob Campbell and Doyle Decker, the
latter of which soon joined with Mailheau and began intelligence operations. 171 The group
ultimately consisted of six core members, which included Clay Conner, Bob Mailheau, Frank
Gyovai, Joe Donahey, Doyle Decker, and Bob Campbell. Mailheau and Decker began to
organize a defense network throughout the barrios that surrounded the Banaba lowlands (see
Figure 3, “Map of the Bataan Peninsula, including Central Luzon” for Banaba’s location relative
to Fassoth’s Camp), through which they could receive information concerning Japanese
garrisons and cooperate with civilians.172 By creating a cooperative network, the 155th could
expand without attracting additional attention, and its members were already well aware of the
dangers of organizing too many American soldiers in one location. While Mailheau, Conner, and
Gyovai’s experiences constantly prevented them from linking up with other guerrillas, the
lessons that they learned in the process ultimately allowed the 155 th to endure for the remainder
of the war.
Over time, Mailheau and Decker worked with each other more than any of the other
members, and Decker shifted from survival with Campbell to active organization alongside
Mailheau. Throughout the initial months of the group’s formation, Mailheau and Decker “were
pretty involved in organizing. This meant many trips to lowland villages gaining the cooperation
of the elders & [sic] youngsters alike, primarily to help us establish a barrio defense system,
through which we could keep tabs on Jap patrols, movements, etc.” 173 Mailheau and Decker
concentrated on barrio recruitment and building support networks while Conner and Gyovai
focused on organizing Negrito resistance, though neither task was exclusive to either pair.
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Figure 3. Map of the Bataan Peninsula, including Banaba in relation to Fassoth’s Camp and
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While Donahey and Campbell “weren’t keen on becoming active members in the
Guerrilla movement” and were left to work on their own initiative, the splitting of priorities
between the two pairs (Decker and Mailheau along with Conner and Gyovai) allowed the unit to
cover more ground and also reduce the risk of the unit’s elimination by dividing its
components.175 By maintaining two dedicated pairs and targeting different elements of the
Philippines’ population, the 155th was able to form a substantial network in surrounding villages
that ultimately expanded the group’s range far beyond the six Americans who directly formed it.
Without the relationships that the 155th created with Negrito and Filipino populations, it would
not have been as successful in persisting and gathering intelligence.
The group’s focus on garnering support from Filipino and Negrito populations led to a
number of advantages during its operation, and allowed the 155 th unit was able to expand its
capabilities far beyond its core membership. The group regularly travelled alongside Filipino and
Negrito allies, many of whom were often armed. While some more modern schemes of guerrilla
warfare list the concealment of weapons as a common trait, neither the American members of the
155th or their allies adopted this tactic.176 Mailheau recalled that the group “carried side arms all
the time. And there were rifles available to us whenever we wanted them. And there was
ammunition in and around. I think that Frank (Gyovai) eventually assembled quite a supply.
Now, we didn’t go heavily armed all the time. Most of the time we did have either Humbo, or
Mario, or some other Negritos with us, with their bows and arrows… Some of them had rifles.
So we were sufficiently protected…”177 The 155th’s allies aided it militarily, medically, and
especially geographically, as indigenous populations were able to provide valuable advice and
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techniques that gave guerrillas an advantage over Japanese soldiers, who only occupied the
islands for a couple of years. As mentioned previously in Decker’s experience, Negritos
provided medical aid to the guerrillas on multiple occasions, and the unit’s ability to mobilize
both groups’ efforts towards a common cause provided a wide berth of dependable backup for
the 155th.
Mailheau was one of the more sociable members of the group, and despite rare
personality conflicts at the time, believed that the unit’s members coexisted fairly well
(especially in light of his more extreme experience with Lieutenant Ramsey). Most of the social
discord within the 155th resulted from tensions brought about by harsh survival conditions, as
well as the adverse effects of living in a tropical climate for an extended period. One of the only
conflicts that Mailheau could recall was an incident with Frank Gyovai that nearly came to
blows, later remarking that,

The only tiff I remember, and I remember this clearly, was in our so called No.2
headquarters, according to Frank’s maps… we had a little tiff. Rainy Season… more
Japs, and since we didn’t know from one day to the next what the hell would happen…
we almost came to blows, but Donahey and Conner calmed us down. From that point on,
I never felt that Frank and I had any differences… My God, after all we’d gone through, I
never felt closer to them [Mailheau referencing all of his fellow guerrillas including
Gyovai].178
While Conner referenced the conflict between the two in one of his writings, Mailheau
never considered it at the time, and Gyovai wrote to him years after the war in order to reestablish their friendship and deny any ill will towards Mailheau. 179 Aside from this incident, the
group operated rather smoothly, likely aided by the decision to split the unit into various pairs.
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While the members of the 155th came from a number of different states and religious
backgrounds, they were able to cooperate for the remainder of the war, which was not a given in
guerrilla warfare in Central Luzon.180
The 155th unit was not a monolithic entity nor an organization with a completely focused
mission, but it was a stable and limited collection of guerrillas who survived by adapting to the
capabilities of their enemy and splitting tactical responsibilities. It faced significant limitations
regarding manpower, but was ultimately able to persist far longer than a more traditionally
powerful unit would have because of its more measured approach to resistance. The varying
willingness of its members to engage in direct resistance also altered the group’s approach, and
rather than focusing on additional weaponry or increasing its number of U.S. soldiers, it was able
to cooperate with both estranged ex-Philippine army soldiers and civilians in order to subvert the
Japanese government’s efforts to root out guerrilla resistance. 181 The delegation of various tasks
to different pairs limited the amount of American personnel in any given location at once, and
the enlistment of civilians made information-gathering much more efficient and able to serve the
disparate groups all involved in the 155th’s operations. It was the definitive proving ground for
Mailheau’s belief that mutual resistance was essential, and the 155 th was accordingly able to
spread far beyond its initial scope and become a hub of resistance for both Negrito and Filipino
forces as well as recruit formerly hesitant soldiers like Doyle Decker, Bob Campbell, and Joe
Donahey. Its operations were not without significant difficulty, however, and the environment
continued to pose major difficulties throughout the group’s period of operation, primarily in the
form of tropical rain, winds, and debilitating infections.
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Disease, Stress, and Hostile Environment
While the 155th’s surrounding support networks allowed the group to maintain a supply
of medicine, the tropical environment still inflicted adverse and crippling effects on Mailheau
and his men. Following the creation of the Barrio defense network in January 1944, Mailheau
contracted a severe tonsil infection and dysentery, the former of which incapacitated him for
weeks. He was unable to carry out any intelligence work, and faced significant difficulty in
maintaining his own physical health after the tonsil infection prevented him from swallowing
any food. His only source of nutrition was a liquid banana mixture made by Decker and Gyovai,
and by the end of the process Mailheau weighed around 125 pounds compared to his usual
weight of 190.182 Decker attempted to administer medical treatment to the best of his ability and
wrote, “His tonsils are the worst I have ever seen. Each looks like a glob of yellow puss. I am
trying to doctor him the best I can. I have been swabbing his throat with three drops of iodine in
a spoonful of water.”183 According to Mailheau, Decker acquired the iodine after traveling into
the lowlands, and decided to utilize it based on a “grandma’s tale” that it would work as a lastditch cure.184 Unbeknownst to Decker, he was using a rather extreme amount of iodine given the
situation, and Mailheau coughed up his own tonsils after it was administered. 185
Needless to say, Mailheau was completely incapacitated by the process, and every day
that passed that he was ill, the sub-headquarters of the 155th were critically compromised. In
addition, Decker also contracted dysentery around the same time, and while it did not affect him
as severely as Mailheau’s ailments, it halted most of the progress of Decker and Mailheau’s
component of the unit and forced them to depend on the support networks that they had created
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for protection. Once again, the group’s remoteness and relationships throughout the surrounding
area paid off, and Decker and Mailheau were not attacked or discovered by any patrols during
the process. However, Mailheau had gone through another period of severe physical degradation
(the first being his time in the Bataan Death March), and the experience’s effects on his morale
and autonomy were dire. When recounting the experience, Mailheau stated, “God, I was down…
Decker had practically saved my life on that,” and stressed multiple times that he completely
attributed his survival to Decker’s improvised treatment. 186
The emotional effects of guerrilla warfare in Central Luzon were similarly severe. While
Mailheau’s depression from his tonsil infection affected his ability to physically function, fellow
guerrilla Frank Gyovai nearly perished as a result of the psychological effects of long-term
survival and isolation. Whereas Mailheau was so severely impeded by his ailments that he could
do little to directly put himself at risk, Gyovai came close to death on at least two occasions as a
result of his mental stress, and while the exact causes of his behavior are unknown, two incidents
described by Mailheau and Decker reveal that Gyovai’s judgement was severely impaired by his
mental state. Following his personal conflict with Mailheau brought on by poor morale and
weather, Gyovai was reported by Conner to have contemplated suicide by jumping from a
nearby waterfall.187 Gyovai ultimately decided against it or was convinced not to by another, and
Mailheau ultimately attributed the incident to the stress of the situation as well as the possibility
that U.S. reinforcements would never come. 188 The second incident however posed a much more
direct threat to Gyovai’s physical health, when he suddenly began to adopt the limited dress of a
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Negrito tribesmen and move in the open even during dangerous weather. Decker directly
witnessed Frank’s strange behavior and wrote,

Frank [Gyovai] seems to think that he is invincible. He has donned a G-string like a
Negrito and goes in all kinds of weather. He will have to pay. Even the Negritos won’t
get out in the rain… Today we received word that Frank is sick. He must have
pneumonia—no medicine. He will be lucky if he survives. Today the natives gather at
Conner’s shack. They have come to practice their native medicine on Frank. I have seen
this before used on a Negrito. He survived and I hope Frank is as lucky. 189
While Gyovai survived the described treatment, the recklessness that he displayed by
openly traveling during the rainy season with practically non-existent clothing was abnormal,
especially considering the unit’s prior experiences with extreme weather. Adapting to the rainy
seasons in the Philippines was already a constant challenge, and both Decker and Mailheau were
forced to seek shelter on multiple occasions in order to avoid it. 190 Decker also mentioned the
Negritos’ avoidance of rainy weather, indicating that Frank’s behavior would have posed a
significant danger even for natives of the jungle climate. Alongside Frank’s contemplation of
suicide, it is one of the most extreme behavioral responses that either Decker or Mailheau
personally described, and proof that their isolation exacted an alarming amount of mental strain.
While all six members of the 155th survived, the Philippines’ debilitating environment remained
a threat that they could never successfully eliminate. Local support was again crucial in their
survival, since in many cases the members of the 155 th were forced to either experiment (i.e.,
Decker’s operation on Mailheau’s tonsils) or consult their allies in order to counter the negative
effects of their stay in the jungle. They were able to survive until American reinforcements
arrived because of their local cooperation, and operated independently of any support from the
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United States until sighting planes in October 1944. Mailheau later rendezvoused with U.S.
forces in spring 1945 alongside Gyovai and Decker. 191
After years of desperate struggle, isolation, and physical torment, Mailheau still planned
to remain with the army for as long as he could following his recuperation, but the long-term
effects of his time in the Philippines had taken their toll on him. After he was reincorporated into
the U.S. military in 1945, Mailheau continued his military career in the following years, and was
promoted to Major in 1947 and then Lieutenant Colonel in 1953. 192 Despite joining the military
to preempt U.S. involvement in Europe, Mailheau had aspirations to continue serving for as long
as he could, but was prevented from doing so by the physical toll of his experiences. 193 Mailheau
stated in a letter written in 1984 that he “retired (military disability) as a lieutenant colonel in
May, 1955… I seriously planned on staying with the service till old age would force me out.
However, the Bataan/Guerrilla experiences took their toll on me physically, and so my career
was short lived…”194 While Mailheau did not elaborate on why he wished to do so, his
willingness to continue his service in the U.S. army despite his experiences was remarkable, and
another example of his willingness to persevere against adversity. However, the physical costs of
his harsh treatment by the Japanese and his multiple bouts of severe weight loss prevented him
from continuing, and Mailheau instead went into banking.

Conclusion
Mailheau faced constant dangers to his physical health from 1942 to 1945, and yet his
persistence against overwhelming hardship was intense even among the other guerrillas of the
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155th. Most of the challenges that faced him were completely unexpected, and he improvised
constantly in order to survive the Japanese occupation. Mailheau joined the army to avoid
conflict, but was forced by circumstance to engage in a protracted conflict for nearly three years.
The guerrilla war that he took part in came about by accident, following a disastrous defeat at the
hands of the Japanese army and weeks of brutal treatment that forced Mailheau to choose
between a potentially lethal escape and continued cruelty at the hands of Japanese soldiers.
Despite this series of unexpected challenges, both Mailheau’s own resolve and the widespread
help provided by those around him enabled him to take part in resistance, and ultimately survive
the war. While he was somewhat familiar with the Negrito tribe’s relationship with the U.S.
government, he could not have anticipated how crucial they would be in helping to resist
Japanese rule, as well as how much they would contribute through navigation, medical aid, and
the reinforcement of Luzon guerrillas. Filipino households contributed immeasurably, and in
Mailheau’s case, directly saved his life following his escape from the Bataan Death March.
Mailheau would have perished without his cooperation with the inhabitants of the Philippines or
his own tenacity, and the combination of both allowed him to achieve far more than he would
have been able to with one alone.
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PRIVATE DECKER: PRIORITIZING SURVIVAL BEFORE RESISTANCE

Private Doyle Decker’s experience in the Philippines was filled with desperation and
constant pressure from hostile patrols and an unforgiving environment. Throughout the invasion
of the Philippines in December 1941, he carried out his orders hoping that the situation would
improve, but it soon became clear to him that defeat was approaching as MacArthur departed and
supplies dwindled. When he and four other soldiers retreated northwest into the mountainside
(either towards Mt. Natib or the Mariveles Mountain Range, both pictured in Figure 4, “Map of
Bataan mountain ranges”) after the destruction of their artillery unit, they struggled to last
beyond the first few weeks of the Japanese occupation as they struggled to evade enemy patrols
and scavenge for food.195 Decker was saved on numerous occasions by the sacrifices and aid of
Filipino and Negrito civilians, and while guerrilla warfare has come to be deeply associated with
a “home turf” mentality, Decker’s cooperation with civilians was often based on necessity as he
and his men constantly struggled to adapt to their surroundings. Decker was primarily motivated
by survival, and while Mailheau and Conner’s 155th unit eventually gave him an opportunity to
participate in a larger unit, his early experiences taught him that to survive, the help of civilians
was ultimately the most important factor.

Decker’s Military Background
Prior to becoming a guerrilla in April 1942, Decker served as an anti-aircraft gunner with
the 200th New Mexico National Guard, coastal artillery unit, anti-aircraft battery H.
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Decker’s motivation for enlistment was mostly to get a steady job as well as serve his
mandatory year of military service required by the peacetime draft in September 1940. 197 He
chose March 1941 as the starting date of his draft year, after which he would either find an
alternative job (a difficult prospect during the Great Depression) or remain in the army. 198 His
motivations were mostly pragmatic, and he chose military service to survive the Great
Depression. While Mailheau’s goal in the Philippines was to avoid potential conflict, Decker’s
was to avoid poverty. After training, Decker was ordered to proceed to San Francisco before
being transported to Manila, Philippines.199 Decker seemed to have little direct input regarding
his posting, while Bob Mailheau stated that he and some other volunteer soldiers made the
decision to go to the Philippines themselves.200 Considering this discrepancy, while the military
had final authority regarding military postings, the relaxed nature of peacetime allowed some to
arrive by choice rather than by forced transfer. For Decker, however, the Philippines were
supposed to be a temporary posting in order to provide him with a job, not a promise of hardship
in jungle terrain for nearly three years.
When Decker learned of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, he was already stationed in
Sternburg hospital in Manila with orders to be sent back to the U.S. after contracting a tropical
fever.201 He learned of the attack through a newspaper on the morning of December 8 th, 1941,
and the news came as a severe shock.202 While the potential for conflict had been previously
discussed in passing, substantial proof of it was a different matter, and Decker soon feared the
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possibility that he would never see his home again.203 He did not have long to process this
information, as wounded soldiers began to pour in from Clark Field after it was attacked on
December 8th. While they had received prior warning of the enemy advance due to the news
regarding Pearl Harbor, there was little time to capitalize on this information. The destruction of
most of the U.S. Navy the day prior meant that the possibility of naval reinforcement was now
nonexistent, and that additional resources would be more difficult to acquire. However, the
soldiers were not aware that most of the Pacific fleet had been lost, and only knew that Pearl
Harbor had been attacked.204 Even barring this knowledge, the Japanese invasion on December
8th irreversibly shifted Decker’s duties from a temporary posting to a long, bitter struggle for
survival. As truckloads of wounded soldiers arrived from Clark Field, Decker helped to take the
wounded into Sternburg Hospital as best he could. 205 While Decker transferred to Bataan weeks
later and continued to serve with the 200th Coastal Artillery Unit, the opening days of the
invasion set a harrowing precedent, and the situation did not improve throughout the coming
months.
Wounded continued to arrive throughout December and January, and Japanese planes
continued to strafe Manila.206 While the 200th did experience some success shooting down
Japanese planes, it was slowly becoming clear to Decker that conditions were not improving. 207
In particular, the gradual cutting of rations and MacArthur’s retreat on March 11 th were
particularly demoralizing to Decker and the soldiers around him, and upon reflection Decker
stated that “…when the army ordered MacArthur out, I think we all realized it was hopeless.” 208
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No matter the strategic reasoning, the removal of MacArthur could only be taken as a lack of
confidence in the U.S. military’s ability to retain control of the islands, and it appropriately
dampened the morale of Decker and the soldiers around him. Additionally, even direct messages
from President Roosevelt to General Wainwright failed to give definitive instructions, and the
military situation continued to worsen. Dwindling food supplies and a complete lack of outside
support also failed to soothe the concerns of many soldiers now faced with operating without
their initial commander, which significantly dampened morale. 209
These dual problems encouraged Decker and a handful of soldiers around him (notably
his Mess Sergeant Clinton “Red” Wolf) to begin making plans to escape to the nearby
mountainside, and began doing so well before any official news of surrender reached them.
Decker wrote at the time, “I have decided to take to the mountains when the time comes. I will
never surrender. I prefer to die in the mountains than to die in prison. We all feel the same way;
we are just marking time; the surrender will come soon.”210 The hopeless tone of this entry
stands out, as well as his description of the atmosphere around him. His attitude cannot merely
be dismissed as individual pessimism considering his statement that the soldiers around him
shared his feelings, and the hopelessness of defending Bataan after MacArthur’s departure drove
several soldiers to make preparations for defeat. Interestingly, he does not mention any particular
cruelty by the Japanese prior to this decision in his original journals, only beginning to take note
of the atrocities that they committed as he encountered evidence of them along the way. His
motivation for resisting was not based on any particular knowledge of Japanese cruelty, and
instead by a more basic desire to avoid capture by any enemy party. While Japan’s wartime
reputation has been thoroughly documented by secondary literature and the guerrillas’ own
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accounts (especially those concerning the Death March and occupation), it was not known by
Decker or Mailheau prior to their encounters with Japanese soldiers and tactics. In any case, once
plans were made, Decker and Wolf began to make preparations for retreating into the mountains
if or when news of surrender reached them, which it soon did in April 1942.
Despite their prior preparations to store weapons in a supply cache, Decker and Wolf
were not able to capitalize on them when they were cut off from their unit. Ironically, Decker
and Wolf departed from their unit on the afternoon of the surrender to get cigarettes from a
neighboring ordinance company, and later found the company overrun by Japanese forces. 211 By
the time they resolved to return to their unit, it had already become dark, and they were unable to
successfully navigate their way back. 212 When they finally managed to return, they learned that
their unit had been overrun, but had to wait until daylight returned in order to move out. 213
Decker and Wolf eventually reunited with their battery commander and two other soldiers, and
set out for the mountains as a group of five total as soon as possible the day after the surrender.
While the signing of the surrender on April 9th ended official hostilities, responses from U.S.
soldiers were a different matter, and Decker, Wolf, and others around them decided against
surrender in any capacity. As of April 9th, however, the conflict with Japan was officially over,
and from that point onwards, many were forced to choose either resistance or surrendering to the
Japanese in hopes of more favorable treatment that they seldom received. Decker resolved to
choose the former, but was faced with much more pressing problems before he could militarily
resist, and the most pressing by far was procuring long-term food and shelter. His group of five
had little or no training in this regard, and it nearly cost them their lives.
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Struggle during the Opening Weeks
The opening weeks of the occupation were some of the most grueling for Decker and his
four fellow soldiers (Dallas Vinette, Red Wolf, Manuel Montoya, and Nino Lucero) as they
attempted to survive in the jungle. 214 While the threat of capture or execution by Japanese
soldiers was their first consideration, hunger and disease were equally hazardous. Despite their
plans to flee into the mountainside prior to the surrender, neither Decker or the soldiers around
him had any extensive survival training, and had very little time to adjust to their new situation
before the climate and maintaining a steady supply of food became distractingly important. 215
The struggle to survive was more pressing than attempts to form any kind of long-term
resistance, and the opening weeks of his survival in the jungle were particularly dire and
disorganized. During the crucial opening weeks, staying alive and healthy became a grueling
task, and before guerrilla units could be organized, Decker and his companions had to learn how
to adapt to their surroundings and learn several crucial lessons that they would later use during
the occupation.
Unsurprisingly, obtaining and maintaining a supply of food had already been one of the
most harrowing challenges Decker faced prior to the surrender at Bataan, and this became an
even direr issue with the dissolution of U.S. command.216 Without a steady food supply, Decker
and fellow guerrillas struggled to procure food from their environment, which many of them
were unfamiliar with. Even prior to the surrender, supplies dwindled within Decker’s artillery
battery, and as the defense of Bataan progressed, it soon became clear that starvation was
becoming a distinct possibility. Decker remarked in his journal that “… our rations are cut
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almost daily. We have already eaten the cavalry horses and mules… How much longer can we
hold out?”217 No matter what the tactical reality was, the Decker and Wolf did not believe that
they could hold out much longer, and while they stayed with the battery to the best of their
ability (even moving the battery’s kitchen multiple times), they ultimately decided to flee into
the mountains if the situation continued to deteriorate, which it soon did.
Conditions worsened once Decker traveled into the mountains, and inconsistent food
supplies frequently hampered his and fellow soldiers’ ability to effectively reason with each
other, let alone organize their efforts. Decker’s group was able to initially rely on rice during the
first few days of their journey into the northern mountainside, but their existing supplies only
lasted 5 days.218 Ten days into their trek through the jungle, tempers quickly flared among he and
his fellow four soldiers as food ran desperately low.219 Throughout the initial ten days, the group
subsisted entirely on leaves and bugs in the absence of any effective substitute (or at the very
least, any that they were aware of). 220 By the tenth day of their journey, they were forced to kill a
wild chicken and eat it nearly raw out of sheer hunger. They were only saved when they were
found by a passing group of three Filipinos who decided to take them in. 221 While they later
observed the eating habits of local tribesmen and learned to survive on papaya, banana, and
coconut plants, their initial unfamiliarity with foraging in the wilderness limited the resources
they were able to use. The opening weeks of survival in the mountains were dangerous,
frightening, and confusing, and the thought of organizing a guerrilla unit in these conditions
bordered on ludicrous.
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Organization was also made much more difficult due to the absence of formal logistics
and a lack of preparation for guerrilla fighting, and soldiers had few definitive ways of proving
simple information such as their former ranks in the military. Soldiers may normally have used
dog tags for identification, but Decker also stated that many (including him) had lost their dog
tags in the months following the fall of the Philippines, either through intentional or accidental
neglect.222 In his specific words, “90 percent of us couldn’t have proved [sic] we was anything,
because as I recall, I don’t even recall having any dogtags… most men I ran into, didn’t have.” 223
In this case, the abandonment of proof regarding rank was not a considered strategy, but instead
resulted from a decrease in the value of rank following the U.S. army’s defeat. Decker’s priority
was not to maintain the protocol and strict hierarchy of the U.S. army, but was instead to survive
and find whatever soldiers he could that he could depend on during the occupation. In cases such
as his later meeting with Lieutenant Henry “Clay” Conner, Decker opted to rely on his instincts
and personal impressions, gravitating towards soldiers like Conner and Mailheau based on their
merit instead of former rank.
Even when identification was not an issue, partnerships were potentially unreliable, and
even prior chains of command did not ensure success. As food began to run low five days into
the occupation, Decker’s personal relationship with Vinette quickly soured as it became clear
that the latter was not well suited to survival in the jungle or the dissolution of command. Decker
described Vinette as being somewhat abrasive, and that he often insisted on being treated with
his former degree of authority, which did little to inspire confidence as Decker’s group struggled
to merely obtain food.224 In one poignant example, Decker stated that “Captain Vinette…
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threatened to shoot me because I wouldn’t go fill his canteen after dark.” 225 While the group
stayed together for approximately ten days, Captain Vinette set out one morning alongside
another soldier to scout out the terrain, and never returned. 226 It is unknown if they were
intercepted by any patrols, taken in by any other groups, or simply deserted Decker and his other
fellow survivors, but it is certain is that they set out and failed to return, reducing the group’s
numbers by two. While relationships between Decker and the other two soldiers who were with
him improved shortly thereafter, Captain Vinette’s disappearance confirmed that the prior chain
of command was not a mark of reliability, and that individual relationships would be more
relevant to survival than adhering to the military’s codes of command and loyalty.
Immediately following the surrender, the rules of life in Luzon completely changed. The
chain of command was no longer a marker of reliability, rank became a secondary concern
compared to basic necessities, and Decker and his fellow men now had to contend with a
survival situation that they all had scarce training for. While the threat of force from Japanese
patrols was a serious concern, the U.S. soldiers’ lack of familiarity with the terrain, foraging
techniques, and securing shelter became much more pressing challenges after they fled into the
jungle. While Decker, Wolf, Lucero, Vinette, and Montoya had been stationed on the island for
months, this did not mean that they had a solid grasp of the local geography beyond the bases
and cities that they had been stationed at, and they all began at a disadvantage as they attempted
to evade capture or death at the hands of the Japanese forces. The line between survival and
resistance remained thin throughout Decker’s experiences as a guerrilla, but was the narrowest
during this initial period. While the Japanese were the invaders, this did not mean that the U.S.
soldiers held much of an advantage in terms of knowledge or navigation, and ultimately,
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Decker’s survival came down to the acts of a number of local groups that were able to provide
him with important lessons about living in the jungle.

Local Aid
The aid given to soldiers like Decker by various groups in the Philippines undeniably
made their survival possible beyond the first few weeks of the occupation. Local planters like
Bill and Edith Fassoth, native tribesmen in the mountains, and a range of Filipino citizens (some
of whom had either been members of the volunteer army) all aided the 155th’s members in some
capacity. Decker and Mailheau deeply appreciated their frequent help, remembering it decades
after the war had concluded. It is not an overstatement to say that Decker would most certainly
have died without their help, and he detailed specific instances of this need for help in his
wartime journal. This help came in the form of refuges, navigational guidance, and resources
provided by various groups throughout Central Luzon despite the best efforts of the new
Japanese territorial government to prevent these kinds of aid. The contributions made by the
Philippines’ inhabitants were materially and psychologically significant, and they deserve
recognition for their part in aiding potentially hundreds of U.S. soldiers who were now trapped
throughout Luzon.
Initially, there was no guarantee that local aid would be reliable or freely given, and
tensions were high following the surrender. While some writers at the time such as Catherine
Porter of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations were optimistic that U.S.
promises would be valued above those of the Japanese, for the time being the U.S. had departed
in the event of enemy attack.227 The Philippines had been militarily abandoned following
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MacArthur’s retreat and Wainwright’s surrender, and the poor support provided to the defense of
the Philippines did not instill confidence in the United States’ ability to make good on its prior
promise of independence, even to its own soldiers. 228 While Wainwright’s decision to surrender
had been made based on rapidly dwindling resources and numerous defensive shortcomings,
there was no way to accurately judge how groups in the Philippines would react in the wake of
conquest. In reality, while some collaborated with the new Japanese government in the opening
months, Decker and Mailheau’s accounts both reveal that there were immediate and significant
pockets of support that provided food and shelter to U.S. soldiers throughout Central Luzon
during not only the opening weeks, but nearly their entire stay. Regardless of this, many soldiers
could not easily determine who was friend or foe, and the new Japanese government heavily
encouraged collaboration. The support that Decker received, however, was not only extensive,
but was given fewer than two weeks into the occupation.
The housing and food that many groups in the Philippines (including both Filipino
citizens and native tribesmen) provided were some of the most essential in the initial weeks,
especially when soldiers like Decker or Mailheau were on death’s door. One day after Vinette’s
aforementioned departure (when the group caught and ate a chicken nearly raw), a Filipino
family took Decker’s group to their house just as he thought he was going mad from hunger, and
it is no exaggeration to say that their hospitality saved Decker and his fellow men. Decker wrote,

When we reach their house they begin to cook some rice. The aroma of the rice cooking
is driving me mad. If they don’t ask me to eat I know I am going to kill them. I must have
food. As I sit there with these awful thoughts going through my mind, I realize how
suddenly a man can turn into an animal. Then I hear the woman say, “Come eat. We have
cooked this for you.” How ashamed I feel. Tears come to my eyes. This is my first
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encounter with the Filipino people. What lovely people. I know I will never forget these
people.229
At a critical moment of physical and emotional vulnerability, Decker was given another
chance to survive, and the significance of this chance was not lost on him. Extreme survival
conditions nearly drove him to violence, and yet he was provided with the food that he
desperately needed mere moments before lashing out. It was not the last time that he was
provided food or housing by Filipino citizens, but it was one of the most important cases, and
between this instance and Mailheau’s recuperation following his time on the Bataan Death
March, it is clear that neither man would have survived without civilian aid. The direness of the
initial conditions that Decker and his men faced in the Philippines should not be underestimated,
and even the gift of individual meals was crucial in ensuring their survival, especially given their
initial unfamiliarity with foraging, finding shelter, or communicating with civilians. In Decker’s
case, he did not speak any of the local languages (such as Tagalog and Spanish) other than
English, had never previously lived in a jungle environment, and was very unfamiliar with the
mountainous terrain in the region.230 There was no guarantee that other guerrillas had any of
these skills, and there was a great need for direction and resources in order to simply survive, let
alone evade capture or death.
However, the Filipinos were not the only significant group inhabiting Luzon, and even
tribesmen in the mountains coordinated with U.S. soldiers throughout the occupation. The extent
of support provided by one of the indigenous tribes in the Philippines (dubbed Negritos, and no
modern name has popularly surfaced) is difficult to ascertain, but they actively organized attacks
on Japanese forces and procured resources for both themselves and Luzon guerrillas on multiple
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occasions. The only other name mentioned for their tribes by Decker is “Bulugas,” the Filipino
term used at the time. Decker recalled, “I traveled the mountains a lot. As a matter of fact, I
crossed them twice. And they [Filipinos] used to accuse me… the Filipinos called the Negritos,
Bulugas, and they always accused me of traveling like a Buluga.” 231 It is unclear whether the
term Buluga is merely descriptive or holds a more dismissive meaning. Historically, the Negritos
are believed to have migrated to the Philippines nearly 30,000 years ago alongside Malay tribes
via a land bridge, and continued to live on Luzon within the mountains.232
They were not as disorganized as their tribal structure would imply, and they served
under a tribal Commander-In-Chief by the name of Kodario Laxamana. 233 Decker and his fellow
guerrillas often worked closely with the Negritos in order to bolster their numbers, since large
groups comprised of Americans tended to arouse greater suspicion from Japanese patrols.
Guerrilla leader Henry “Clay” Conner Jr. (who later personally organized the 155 th guerrilla
group, the only persistent guerrilla group that Decker was involved with) later personally sent a
story to Life Magazine in 1949 in order to express his gratitude and regard for Kodario, who
Conner described as a “close companion during the war (who) rallied the Negritos to organize
Guerrilla Force 155.”234 While his accounts were generally accepted both by his comrades and
researchers as being romanticized, Kodario’s group cooperated closely with the 155 th and
provided them with a much greater pool of manpower. Conner claimed in at least two articles
that Kodario had personally killed 50 Japanese soldiers during the occupation before his death.
However, in historian Dwayne Sanford’s conversations with Decker during his initial research
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into guerrilla actions on Luzon, Sanford stated that Conner had a tendency for telling “extremely
good stories” that had some basis in truth, but were likely exaggerated in their presentation (in all
likelihood referring to impressive figures such as 50 alleged kills and 17 decapitations that
Conner claimed Kodario personally carried out). 235 Exaggerations aside, Kodario and the
Negritos both significantly aided soldiers like Decker, Conner, and Mailheau, and engaged in
active military resistance against the Japanese alongside American guerrillas.
There are also scattered accounts of smaller-scale help provided by Negrito tribesmen on
Luzon, and the descriptions given by Doyle Decker indicate that while verbal communication
with tribesmen was often limited, they formed working relationships with guerrillas on Luzon
that directly contributed to their survival. Decker directly described his difficulties with
communicating with the Negritos in a telephone interview decades later, during which he stated
that he and a fellow soldier named Bob Campbell,

Couldn’t have possibly told the Negritos anything, because neither one of us spoke the
Negrito dilect [sic], and we just about half-assed spoke Tagalog, and that was just enough
to get in trouble and not enough to get back out. And I spoke just a little bit of Spanish.
But the only Negrito that I ever talked to outside of sign language, was to three Negritos
that we had taught to speak English… You don’t talk to [sic] much in sign language; you
can get what you want to keep from getting killed, I guess. 236
Even in the absence of reliable verbal communication, Luzon guerrillas were able to form
close relationships with Negritos on the island, and soldiers like Conner and Decker both praised
them for being unexpectedly and thoroughly supportive of American soldiers. When reflecting
on his time in the Philippines, Decker stated that “We began to organize the Negritos, which
were very primitive people but true-blue and loyal to the Americans. If there was ever a traitor
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among the Negritos, I never heard about it.” 237 Despite the help that he also received from
Filipino families, Decker only described the Negrito tribesmen as being legitimately trustworthy,
and Mailheau also attested to their patriotism and loyalty. 238 Decker also engaged in multiple
transactions with Negritos throughout his time in the Philippines, including at least one case in
which he compensated them with salt to act as navigational guides. 239 Accounts of these
transactions are scattered, but Decker’s interactions were not limited to temporary deals. He also
stayed with Negrito tribesmen for extended periods multiple times, including one stretch during
which he stayed alongside them for at least a week at Fassoth’s Camp, a friendly camp for U.S.
soldiers located in the mountains.240
Fassoth’s Camp was a refuge created by local planter Bill Fassoth along with his wife
Edith, and it served as one of the most useful resources for Luzon guerrillas during the first few
weeks of the occupation. The camp provided many essentials that were otherwise unavailable,
including consistent shelter, a steadier food supply, and a location unknown to the Japanese for a
period longer than a few days. All three of these factors were particularly important considering
that the primary goals of many guerrillas in Central Luzon were to survive and avoid the
Japanese in order to link up with larger units. 241 Decker’s account indicates that for him and the
soldiers around him, one of the most difficult challenges they faced was maintaining an adequate
supply of food and lasting shelter, and the temporary camps that the soldiers created were no
replacement for dependable housing. While it is difficult to truly determine the relative fame of
the camp due to the chaos of occupation, Decker stated that he and another soldier were told
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about Fassoth’s camp by other soldiers while hunting, which implies some degree of
dissemination among American soldiers trapped on Luzon. 242 In Decker’s words,

We met some men who told us about Fassoth’s Camp and offered to guide us
there…After at least a day’s travel, we came to a barrio at about noon. Our guides left us
and went into the barrio and didn’t return until almost dark… Later on in the night we
were awakened and told that we were leaving for Fassoth’s Camp. We walked all night
and finally arrived at Fassoth’s later the following day. 243
Decker personally attested to the camp’s significance, and it helped him both to recover
his strength and begin finding other U.S. guerrillas. He described the camp as a particularly
helpful and welcome refuge, and even stated that the Fassoths provided aid without asking for
anything in return save for occasional trips into the jungle to procure meat. 244 Decker stated that
the soldiers were able to stay at the camp for “several weeks” (there is no exact dating since
information regarding time was limited), and during that time soldiers stayed alongside other
guerrillas, Filipinos, and even Negrito tribesmen who all stayed at the camp. 245 The camp hosted
a variety of individuals, including even Catholic Priests in one case, who had presumably come
to the camp to provide religious guidance. In one case of unfortunate misunderstanding, Decker
clarified that he was a Baptist when asked if he needed help by one of the Priests, to which the
priest broke into tears and replied “I am here to help everybody, not just the Catholics.” 246 While
there were smaller-scale misunderstandings like this that naturally arose from the sheer variety of
individuals within the camp, it nevertheless served as a focal point for aid at a time when several
different groups needed such a location. Food came from several sources (including a buck deer

242

Decker, Why I Joined the Army, 10.
Ibid, 10-11.
244
Ibid, 12.
245
Decker, Journal Entries, 24.
246
Ibid, 26.
243

84

brought in by the Negritos in at least one case), but Decker nevertheless stated that the camp was
everything that he and his fellow group had heard that it was, and that he “always held them [the
Fassoth Family] in the highest respect.”247
However, the camp was eventually abandoned by Decker and other U.S. guerrillas as
discovery by the Japanese grew more likely, and he described the departure of soldiers as a slow
and cautious withdrawal rather than a concentrated movement. Soldiers simply began to feel that
staying in the same location for a prolonged period was dangerous, and that they needed to move
on before the Japanese discovered the camp. Despite his initial reservations, Decker left the
camp alongside soldiers Bob Campbell, Henry Winslow, and Sergeant Banks (whose first name
is not listed in Decker’s writing). Decker recalled years later that he “didn’t want to leave the
camp but we had been warned that the camp was to be raided—twice… Also, it was getting
harder to get supplies each day, so after telling the Fassoths good-bye early one morning… I left
camp and headed for Olongapo.”248 While the direct warnings were sufficient cause for
restlessness, a nagging sense of danger had weighed on Decker prior to them, and the gradual
arrival of people that Decker described as “strange” also contributed to his decision. 249 He never
specified what he meant by this in his journal, but his description of uncertainty regarding the
allegiances of Filipinos means that he likely became unnerved by the numbers of people coming
into the camp, and determined that the growing likelihood of information being leaked to the
Japanese was high enough that he needed to depart the camp.
Decker’s fears were well founded, because the camp was indeed raided and burned
shortly thereafter.250 He later received word that the camp was raided the night after he left, but
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was never able to confirm it.251 He and his three fellow soldiers evaded multiple Japanese patrols
on their way Southwest to Olongapo (roughly 30-35 miles, see Figure 5, “Wider map of Central
Luzon”), and walked through watery areas in order to avoid leaving any tracks. 252 This had the
unfortunate side effect of rendering their feet nearly unusably sore, but they successfully evaded
any hostile encounters and took refuge with a Filipino family in yet another critical provision of
aid from the people of the Philippines. Japanese patrols were heavy, however, and soon the
group of four was forced yet again to live among the Negritos in the mountains in order to evade
capture or confrontation.253 After departing from Fassoth’s camp, shelter and travel were once
again inconsistent and daily avoidance became the primary objective.
Eventually, the group decided to split off due to the danger of travelling in larger
numbers, which was a tactic used by both Decker and Mailheau in order to avoid discovery by
enemy forces. Debate arose over who would comprise the new pairs after the split, so the group
decided to draw straws, since it was the most impartial method they could think of. 254 Decker
and Bob Campbell were paired through this process, and they later stayed together throughout
the rest of the occupation as part of the 155th guerrilla unit under Lieutenant Conner.255 While
their stay at Fassoth’s camp only lasted for a brief time, it provided the environment that Decker
and other guerrillas needed in order to compose themselves and plan ahead, and was some of the
most important sources of food and shelter that Decker encountered in the Philippines. The camp
was a meeting point of many different groups including runaway soldiers, tribesmen, and even
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clergy, and played a pivotal role in allowing soldiers to meet contacts and begin organizing
guerrilla units like the 155th.
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Figure 5. Wider map of Central Luzon, including both Fassoth’s camp and Olongapo.
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Formation of the 155th Guerrilla Unit
Soon after leaving Fassoth’s camp, Decker and Bob Campbell made contact with
Lieutenant Conner, who informed them that he was considering creating a dedicated guerrilla
unit. Decker’s contact with Conner was a major turning point, since it introduced him to a
number of fellow guerrillas who he stayed with throughout the rest of the occupation. While it
enabled Decker to settle in with a consistent group of soldiers, the struggle to survive remained
severe enough that the group’s capabilities were limited. While the 155 th engaged in daily
reconnaissance work in order to coordinate with larger U.S. forces, its members were limited by
the same environmental ills that had hindered them as individual guerrillas. While the unit’s
resources were greater than the scope of its core six members, disease still ran rampant, and at
times prevented Decker and Mailheau from fully functioning, let alone engaging in risky military
reconnaissance. Decker remained with the 155th for the rest of the occupation, and despite its
limitations, Conner’s efforts resulted in a guerrilla unit that was not eliminated or discovered
easily by Japanese patrols that persisted until the liberation of the Philippines in fall 1945.
Issues initially arose around the group’s formation and scope, not helped by the
guerrillas’ frequent inability to prove their own rank. When Decker and Campbell first met
Conner, Campbell initially questioned Conner’s legitimacy as an officer despite Decker’s
indication that they would have been similarly unable to prove their identities. 257 They ultimately
decided to follow Conner to his camp, and finally rendezvoused with a prospective guerrilla unit.
Among the group was Bob Mailheau, who Decker quickly formed a close friendship with. 258
While the opening months of 1942 were defined by extraordinary hardship and an almost
constant risk of starvation or capture, Decker engaged in much more consistent intelligence work

257
258

Malcolm Decker, Essential Commentary Made by Doyle Decker, 10.
Decker, Why I Joined the Army, 14.

88

following the creation of Conner’s unit, which later became known as the 155 th Guerrilla
Squadron.259 Though the unit only directly consisted of six men (Conner, Mailheau, Gyovai,
Donahey, Decker, and Campbell), the group’s membership also functionally extended to allied
Negritos and was the most persistent organized group that Decker encountered, lasting until the
end of the occupation in 1945. While the 155th Guerrilla Squadron could never address all of the
risks and problems of the occupation, it did introduce a degree of stability for Decker that had
not been available prior to its formation, and was a key contributor to the survival of the men
who formed it.
Around the same time that Decker and Bob Campbell made contact with Conner, they
attempted to organize Negrito resistance against the Japanese occupation, despite their limited
ability to meaningfully communicate.260 Decker and Campbell taught three Negrito brothers to
speak English, which was ultimately the limit of their communication outside of limited Tagalog
and sign language.261 Just as it was forming defense networks throughout surrounding barrios,
the 155th continued to cooperate with Negrito tribesmen, and they continued to receive guidance,
shelter, food, and even medicine from the Negritos. While cooperation with mountain tribesmen
may seem like a risky proposition, they were actually one of the more patriotic groups in the
Philippines, and Decker stated that while “Some (Filipinos) we can trust, some maybe not… the
Negritos... were very primitive people but true-blue and loyal to the Americans.” 262 Decker
emphatically and consistently vouched for their loyalty, and continued to sporadically live and
work among them even after joining Conner’s unit. As mentioned previously, Decker was
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sometimes accused of traveling like a Negrito through the mountains, and the Negritos’ methods
inspired some of the other travel and survival techniques used by Decker and his fellow
guerrillas.263 U.S. guerrillas and Negrito tribesmen also successfully exchanged medical
techniques on multiple occasions, and engaged in medical procedures in order to heal each other.
Decker and Mailheau’s role in the 155th mostly consisted of intelligence gathering, and
their location around Banaba enabled them to do so in the lowlands while relaying information to
Conner at the main headquarters. 264 Even with a pool of six men to work with, the group’s role
never really expanded beyond intelligence, due to both limited resources, an overwhelming
military disadvantage, and a refusal by the U.S. military to provide additional weapons. Decker
requested weaponry from the U.S. army just prior to the reclamation of the Philippines to prevent
Japanese incursions into the nearby mountains, but was denied due to fears of interception by the
Hukbalahap group, which had already occurred in April 1942. 265 Decker personally believed that
the group could have been capable of completely removing the Japanese presence from the
surrounding mountains, but the 155th was never granted the opportunity. Considering the
consistent reluctance and caution that Decker had exercised throughout the occupation, his claim
was likely more than brazen speculation, but nevertheless his guerrilla unit was never given the
chance to prove or refute him. The 155th continued to gather information until the U.S. invasion
of Lingayen Gulf in January 1945, which was the beginning of the U.S. reclamation of the
Philippines from Japan.
Despite an increased access to limited medicine, disease and nutritional issues continued
to hound the unit. Malaria and dysentery were especially frequent during the rainy seasons, and
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posed a significant problem alongside the limited mobility that was often caused by intense
rainfall.266 Medicine was limited, and nearly all of the 155th’s members incurred a serious
ailment throughout their time of operation. Decker and Mailheau both contracted dysentery,
incurring additional fatigue, capacity for disease, and a dangerous lack of appetite in an
environment with food that was already limited mostly to papayas, bananas, and mangos, with
very little access to meat.267 Mailheau additionally suffered from a tonsil infection, which
completely incapacitated him. Fellow member Frank Gyovai nearly perished after contracting
pneumonia, and was only saved by a medicinal ritual conducted by Negritos. 268 Nearly all of
these diseases once again shifted focus to survival, and severely limited the ability of the
guerrillas to even engage in self-defense, let alone conduct reconnaissance. No amount of
organization could alter the climate or patterns of disease, and while the members of the 155 th
were lucky enough to survive their afflictions, they did so only after coming dangerously close to
death at the hands of their environment.

Withdrawal from the Philippines
Decker’s first recollection of returning U.S. forces was September 21 st, 1944, when he
sighted American planes flying overhead as both he and Mailheau struggled with disease. 269 The
mere sight of American planes boosted morale, and even though he did not observe or describe
any decisive offensive action from the planes, the promise of the U.S. military’s return inspired
both Decker and Mailheau to continue their efforts of survival and information gathering. 270 The
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U.S. military’s reclamation of the Philippines effectively began about a month afterwards on
October 20th, 1944, when a massive invasion force began conducting landings after efforts to
conduct air reconnaissance throughout the preceding months. 271 The 155th’s other avenue of
information regarding military plans was a downed Navy pilot named Henry Hogan, who was
also the only pilot that they were able to rendezvous with throughout the occupation. 272 He
informed them of the American forces’ basic plans, and both where and when they could be
expected to arrive.273
Due to this information, the 155th had ample time to consider and plan around the
American invasion of the Philippines in fall 1944, and their main concerns were surviving for the
duration of the American reclamation and re-connecting with official U.S. military forces. While
the return of American planes brought tremendous hope and promises of liberation, they also
provided a newfound sense of danger. Decker expressed fear at the thought of being killed by a
friendly American air strike, especially as the U.S. military presence continued to intensify. 274
Air strikes had become nearly daily as 1944 progressed, and the thought of death at the hands of
American planes after surviving horrible conditions for nearly two and a half years was as real as
fears of death at the hands of Japanese patrols. Luckily, none of the 155 th were killed by friendly
fire, but Decker’s fears were well founded as the number of friendly air strikes continued to
escalate. When the 155th received word that American forces landed at Lingayen Gulf, they
began to make preparations to rejoin them while resolving to hold their position until evacuation
orders were given.275
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Even near the end of the war, conditions were still dangerous enough to necessitate
extreme caution. Japanese forces were in the midst of mounting a desperate defense, and
continued to resist the American reclamation any way that they could. As military pressure from
the U.S. continued to grow, Japanese forces began to destroy fuel dumps in order to hinder the
American advance, and considering Japan’s critical reliance on former resources, this move was
motivated more by desperation than by the resource extraction that their military had previously
depended on.276 Even near the end, however, Japanese patrols were a constant danger for Decker
and the men around him. They received orders to avoid Japanese forces at all costs, and took
refuge in a Barrio in order to stay the night and reconnect with U.S. forces the next day. The
night that they stayed, however, a Japanese patrol entered the barrio, resulting in the death of a
Japanese soldier and the wounding of two American guerrillas. 277 While the incident did not
result in an American fatality, it was still a brutal reminder that death was determined in a matter
of moments, and that even as U.S. forces reclaimed the Philippines, they could not afford to be
caught off guard.
After their last encounter with a Japanese patrol, Decker’s group managed to successfully
rendezvous with American forces near the city of Angeles, which had been a popular spot for
soldiers on leave prior to the war. In the process, they departed from their Negrito allies, and
Decker described it as a “tearful good-bye” after the two years that they had worked closely with
both him and the other members of the 155th.278 The rendezvous with American forces went
without incident, and Decker’s group caught the attention of friendly planes by waving an
American flag tied to a stick, after which they were joined by a squad of infantry. 279 Their time
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as guerrillas ended just prior to June 1945, though they did not immediately depart from the
Philippines. In June 1945, Decker and Mailheau (who somehow managed to stay together
throughout the entire process) flew to Manila, then Saipan in the Mariana Islands, and eventually
to Honolulu, Hawaii before finally being flown stateside to San Francisco. 280 Finally after
reaching stateside, Decker flew to Springfield, Missouri, where he remained until being
discharged from the military on April 26th, 1946.281

Conclusion
Decker’s struggle was defined by constant necessity and hardship, as well as the
consistent support that he received from the Philippines’ inhabitants along the way. He joined the
U.S. military in order to become financially stable and quietly serve the term of his draft, not to
take revenge against Germany or Japan as many did following the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Despite his best efforts to prepare for the worst, he was cut off from larger numbers of U.S.
troops by an ill-timed excursion rather than any conscious decision to leave, but subsisted with
his best efforts. He nearly starved on multiple occasions, contracted a number of harrowing
diseases, and struggled to endure the harsh conditions of the Philippines in a climate and
landscape that he was unfamiliar with, only saved by cooperation from fellow soldiers and by the
generosity of the Filipinos and Negritos who harbored him. Without the planters, tribesmen, and
families who willingly gave him food and shelter time and time again, it is extremely unlikely
that he would have survived, and the number of times that he escaped contact with Japanese
patrols by mere hours was a constant reminder of the pressure that the Japanese government was
able to put on guerrillas attempting to resist their rule. His experiences prove that despite
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common traits, guerrilla warfare is not a set of absolute tenets, and that the struggle to survive
takes priority above weakening the enemy, striking targets, or making plans to instill a new
government. Death was a constant threat, and the relationships that he formed with other
guerrillas and the inhabitants of Luzon was one of the only advantages that kept him alive.

95

ENDURING LESSONS, NEW PERSPECTIVES

Imperial Japanese doctrine correctly assumed that local cooperation and the flow of
information were both incredibly important to its expansion, but these factors held true in the
Philippines to its detriment.282 Local cooperation was one of the most important factors
contributing to the Luzon guerrillas’ continued survival, and examples of this are prevalent
throughout Mailheau and Decker’s accounts. From Mailheau’s rescue and months of aided
recovery after escaping the Bataan Death March to the provision of food and housing to Decker
in moments of near-madness, the people of the Philippines demonstrated a willingness to
sacrifice their own resources and time in order to keep U.S. soldiers alive, and their importance
in ensuring that guerrilla conflict persisted should not be understated. 283 Even when civilians in
the Philippines were unwilling to directly participate in military conflict, their roles in relaying
information and providing shelter allowed groups like the 155 th to expand far beyond their
physical scope and last until the war’s end. Without help from individuals and groups like the
Fassoths, Filipino volunteer army, Kodario Laxamana, or Negrito tribesmen, guerrilla resistance
in Central Luzon would have been far more limited and may very well have expired before 1944,
let alone the end of the war.

Decker and Mailheau’s Experiences
Decker and Mailheau’s accounts repeatedly emphasize one critical part of guerrilla
warfare: without civilian cooperation, resistance would have proven impossible. Both men nearly
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died on multiple occasions, and often survived only through the heroism and sacrifices of several
families and groups throughout Luzon. Without the contributions that many made during the
opening days of the Japanese occupation, Mailheau would most likely have died miles away
from the Death March of complete exhaustion, and Decker would have perished from starvation
or disease as he struggled to adapt to his environment during the opening weeks of his survival in
the jungle. Without the guides who volunteered to help Decker, he and his group may well have
wandered aimlessly through Central Luzon until they perished at the hands of an enemy patrol or
wasted away from hunger. Finally, without the help that the 155 th received from the barrio
intelligence networks that they created, the group would not have been able to persist for as long
as it did or meaningfully expand beyond its membership of six, who working alone would have
been extremely limited in their capabilities.
Oftentimes, Decker and Mailheau had more positive experiences interacting with Filipino
and Negrito leaders than with other U.S. soldiers. While it was clear that loyalty did not
universally shift towards either the U.S. or Japan, the number of times that Decker was able to
take refuge in local homes throughout Luzon was remarkable. 284 Mailheau became convinced
that the guerrilla movement and Philippine population depended on each other for survival,
especially in the wake of his experiences during the Death March. Mailheau and especially
Decker received constant aid and direction from sympathetic individuals, and in many cases
could not expect the same degree of cooperation from other groups of U.S. soldiers. Tensions ran
high during the occupation, and along the way several smaller groups of U.S. guerrillas either
quarreled with each other or kept their distance out of a fear of limited supplies or enemy spies.
This paranoia caused soldiers to behave irrationally, refusing to link with other groups or even
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threatening to use force against fellow American guerrillas in desperation. 285 This meant that the
Philippine citizenry had a direct role in deciding the fates of several guerrillas, and while they
could not be universally depended on, in many cases Decker and Mailheau had little choice.
Uncertainty was widespread in Central Luzon, especially in matters of intelligence and
allegiance, which meant that cooperation became extremely valuable. By aiding the resistance
effort, the people of the Philippines gave credence to Mailheau’s theory that for the islands to
continue unhindered by Japanese rule, guerrillas and civilians would have to engage in a mutual
relationship of information and aid. While the guerrilla units were able to provide rallying points
for anti-Japanese sentiment, civilians directly engaged in the information-gathering that these
units needed to counter the superior numbers and organizational reach of the new PhilippineJapanese government.286 By tracking Japanese movements and military presence through civilian
reports, guerrillas were better able to either avoid combat or wait for more favorable
circumstances before engaging the enemy, which was invaluable when resources were not
widely available to the guerrillas. Civilian intelligence expanded the 155 th, a group primarily
comprised of six American soldiers desperately trying to merely survive in a tropical
environment, into a much more extensive organization capable of enduring the length of the
occupation and making contact with other local sources of resistance.
The 155th’s experiences show that contrary many of the “home turf” perceptions of
guerrilla warfare, U.S. soldiers had no formal survival training, and were initially reliant on
assistance from sympathetic civilians. Simply put, Decker and the other soldiers around him like
Wolf had no idea how to survive in the jungle environment of Central Luzon without proper
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backup or guidance, and nearly ran themselves in circles trying to navigate the terrain. 287 Foodgathering also went poorly, and Decker’s group nearly starved as they tried to survive with their
remaining rations and whatever they could scavenge from the environment. 288 While the
Japanese were the invading party, this did not mean that the guerrillas were more familiar with
the Philippines’ geography or resources. The process was not as simple as asking for survival
lessons, but the functions that civilians served as navigators, providers of housing and food, and
even soldiers helped Decker survive well beyond the opening weeks of the occupation and
eventually operate with some modicum of efficiency in the jungle. 289
There are many obvious flaws with exclusively using primary accounts to analyze
guerrilla warfare, but oftentimes the human core of it is lost in secondary analysis. While there
are common markers and definitions, guerrilla units are comprised of human beings. In the case
of the 155th, members lacked any degree of formal guerrilla training. While the common image
of the guerrilla soldier conjures feelings of rugged individuality, strategic raids, and ideological
causes, these traits do not effectively apply to the experiences that I have described. Cooperation
was necessary, strikes were limited in favor of evasion and intelligence, and the 155 th did not
fight to create a new government or take any administrative control over Central Luzon. The
thoughts of fear, isolation, and paranoia present in Decker and Mailheau’s accounts are much
more direct than in more detached analyses, and while this detachment can make it easier to
analyze the big picture of the war in the Philippines, it also communicates the tremendous losses
that the U.S. suffered in the defense of Bataan less effectively. Personal accounts are beneficial
because they maintain the human elements of history, especially within complex situations like
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the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. Taken with the proper degree of care, they can act as
an excellent supplement to the existing history, and there needs to be more personalized accounts
of history that are analyzed for their unique content and not merely relegated to historical fiction.

Final Conclusion
Mailheau and Decker’s stories reveal that relationships with the local populace are some
of the most important elements of guerrilla warfare, and that information can make the difference
between success and failure. Relationships with local populations are still incredibly important in
modern U.S. military operations, and the 155th’s story provides several reason as to why. The
group was directly saved by intervention from local households and families in several instances
and continued to build upon and create new relationships throughout the rest of their time in
Central Luzon. The contributions that Mailheau and Decker received in the opening weeks were
what enabled them to survive and find other like-minded soldiers like Conner and Gyovai, and
cooperation with Filipino and Negrito populations was more important than ever after the 155 th
guerrilla unit’s formation. Through information networks and cooperation with several groups,
the unit enabled all six members with the support that they needed to survive and eventually
return home. Decker and Mailheau’s experiences were desperate and rife with uncertainty, but
through their relationships with the people of Central Luzon, they were able to survive and attest
to the sacrifices that were made so that they could live through three years of isolation and
conflict.
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